A/HRC/45/45/Add.3 82. The national strategy document for transitional justice in the Gambia notes that vetting and ejecting the individuals responsible for abuses from public office is an integral part of the process of restoring the trust of the victims and the society as a whole in State institutions, and that this should involve using an individual, case-by-case approach rather than collectively dismissing people. 83. The Government initially replaced the heads of the police, prison service, intelligence service and the army.23 However, by the time of the Special Rapporteur’s visit, no wider vetting exercise had taken place in the affected institutions. Moreover, as noted by multiple stakeholders during the visit and in reports, individuals accused of perpetrating or enabling human rights abuses continued to work within civil and security services, including in high-ranking positions.24 84. In February 2017, the National Intelligence Agency was renamed the State Intelligence Service. However, this change was mainly nominal and has not been supported by a change in the agency’s legal framework. The State Intelligence Service and its agents are still governed by the military decrees enacted in the prior regime. Officers of the Service have indicated that they refrain de facto from exercising some of the excessive powers granted by the dated decrees. A new Act governing the Service is being prepared. In addition, reports indicate that officials in the current management of the Service previously served in the National Intelligence Agency and in other high-level security sector positions under the government of former President Jammeh. 25 85. Civil society has pressed for the dissolution of the State Intelligence Service. At the very least, they expect to see an institutional and legal overhaul of the agency and the vetting of its officials. Civil society has also demanded that the headquarters of the Service be moved to a new location, so as to preserve the material evidence in the current premises.26 It could also be preserved as a memorial site. 86. Other security sector institutions are also still formally governed by the regulations of the previous regime. In the case of the security agencies ascribed to the Ministry of Interior, including police, prison, immigration and fire services, an informal general code of conduct and standard operational procedures has been drafted – on the basis of standards on the use of force – while awaiting the official reform of the governing legislation of the institutions. Aside from being informal, however, it is unclear if or how this code is used by officials in these institutions. The Ministry of Interior has reported that they are waiting for the outcomes of the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission to start the vetting process of the institutions ascribed to the Ministry. 87. Strong and independent civil oversight mechanisms – an essential element of a comprehensive security sector reform – are still lacking in the law enforcement, intelligence and defence services. 88. Civil society reported an insufficiency of human rights education in police training programmes. Law enforcement officers are also insufficiently trained in crime detection, interrogation and crowd control methods. Human rights awareness is low among law enforcement agencies and within the public service in general. 27 This training gap can lead, and in some cases has led, to reduced human rights protection and renewed abuses by security officers. 28 In a meeting at the Ministry of Interior, the Special Rapporteur was informed that the Ministry had requested and received international assistance to provide human rights training to police officers. 89. Several United Nations entities joined forces to support the security sector reform process in the Gambia at the outset of the transition, and a $1.4 million package was 23 24 25 26 27 28 16 See www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/gambia; and Human Rights Foundation, “Universal periodic review submission for the Gambia: NGO submission”, 28 March 2019, para. 6. Gambia Center for Victims of Human Rights Violations, submission for the universal periodic review, p. 1. Ibid. Ibid. Joint submission 7, UPR 2019, p. 6. Available at www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRGMStakeholdersInfoS34.aspx. For example, during demonstrations in Faraba Banta in 2018.