A/HRC/28/69 a localized freeze of hostilities in Aleppo city. It emphasizes a bottom-up approach to resolving the conflict through the reinforcement of localized agreements that can be replicated on a larger scale, facilitating a gradual transition towards a wider political solution. No specific plan has been presented to date, but success of the Aleppo freeze will be a litmus test for the success of this model in other areas. 115. While a gradual transition with solid confidence-building measures could reduce hostilities locally and improve humanitarian conditions, it will ultimately need to address a longer-term perspective. Although the Geneva communiqué provided an framework for a political settlement, contentious issues remain, including the scope and nature of the opposition’s representation in any transitional arrangement. President Assad’s role in the transitional phase remains a deeply contentious issue among the parties. These aspects must be addressed before a lasting agreement can be seriously contemplated. B. Involvement of external actors 116. Beyond the internal escalation, triggered in March 2011 by the Government’s excessive use of force against largely unarmed protests, several external actors have contributed to the militarization process that transformed the unrest into a brutal civil war. 1. Involvement of influential States on both sides of the conflict 117. Since the uprising began, some States have endeavoured to influence the conduct of various parties according to their geopolitical interests. Their support extended to the financial and military realms, giving the warring parties, though unequally, the required capabilities to escalate or at least maintain their engagement. In particular, countries in the region are competing for influence over the belligerents, gradually transforming the Syrian crisis into a regional contest. 118. Critical financial and military assistance injected by different States into the conflict has fuelled the warring parties’ unwillingness to compromise as they continued to believe that they could prevail militarily. The limited efforts of the international community to restore peace and stability in the region have been jeopardized by some States’ continuous support for the parties, to the advantage of hard-liners on all sides. 119. The consistent support provided to the Government by its international backers, in terms of military equipment, advice and training, encouraged it to persist in its military and security approach based on the excessive use of force. Such support enabled it to adjust the posture, capabilities and structure of its forces to asymmetric fighting against the escalating armed violence. 120. States supporting the opposition have also provided various groups and coalitions with lethal and non-lethal military equipment. Owing to self-imposed restrictions, the scale and policy of this support never gave these groups the required capabilities to seriously challenge government forces in the medium and long terms. Despite all the precautions allegedly taken by the States steering the process, the support given to the so-called “moderates” has ultimately consolidated the dominance of extremist groups such as ISIS and Jabhat Al-Nusra, which managed to overrun the positions of moderates and to gain loyalties among their ranks. 2. Involvement of non-State actors from neighbouring States 121. Several non-State actors from States in the region have participated in the war either through the direct deployment of their forces or by the provision of logistical and financial support to one side or the other. Their entry has been facilitated by the porosity of large parts of the Syrian borders. 18