A/HRC/21/48 asbestos remains alarmingly high (in some cases, production has increased), including in countries that have ratified the Convention. 64. Thirdly, the obligations contained in the conventions are often inadequate to address the problems related to hazardous wastes. For example, Convention No. 169 only requires consultation with affected indigenous and tribal peoples in decision-making on the extraction of natural resources and only provides for compensation for damage from harms caused by such extraction rather than mitigation, which could be accomplished through a robust free, prior and informed consent procedure. Likewise, the other conventions mentioned above contain critical qualifiers to obligations based on “national conditions and practice” which can result in reduced standards in some countries on the grounds that they lack the resources to meet obligations under one or more conventions. C. Non-binding international agreements 65. States participating in the World Summit for Sustainable Development, held in Johannesburg, South Africa in 2002, agreed on an ambitious goal of achieving the sound management of chemicals throughout their lifecycle by the year 2020. To achieve this goal, States attending the International Conference on Chemicals Management, held in Dubai in 2006, adopted the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM), a non-binding, voluntary initiative that comprises the Dubai Declaration on International Chemicals Management; the Overarching Policy Strategy; and a Global Plan of Action. Although SAICM features a participatory structure and the implicit inclusion of an objective to mitigate the human rights implications of extractive industries, States and private industry bear no legal obligations, and funding for the process has not been commensurate with the task of meeting the 2020 goal. 66. The emergence of SAICM as a non-binding, voluntary initiative coincides with a general trend towards voluntary corporate social responsibility principles and international standards.38 Industry-led initiatives, such as the International Cyanide Management Code for the Manufacture, Transport and Use of Cyanide in the Production of Gold and the International Council on Mining and Metals Sustainable Development Framework, have both strengths and weaknesses. Their strength lies in the fact that the agreements are typically adopted by a large number of relevant private actors, providing an initial set of principles from which to build both corporate policies and practices, as well as a more detailed set of norms and management frameworks for extractive industries. 67. However, these initiatives are generally regarded as insufficient and minimal, establishing expectations at or below current practices. In some cases, companies which operate in strictly a domestic context are excluded from their scope; in others, regional or economic groupings impede global legitimacy. Voluntary initiatives also raise several other governance challenges, such as a fragmented disconnection with other international tools and legal instruments, and limited participation, transparency and accountability, with weak investigatory, monitoring and reporting mechanisms. 38 18 These include the International Cyanide Management Code for the gold mining industry; the Environmental Excellence in Exploration (E3); the Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative; the Global Reporting Initiative; the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) Sustainable Development Framework; the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; the Towards Sustainable Mining (TSM) Guiding Principles; the United Nations Global Compact, among others.