A/HRC/38/38 devoted to the independence and impartiality of prosecutors and prosecution services (A/HRC/20/19). 31. Not all the States that responded to the questionnaire have established a national body or mechanism in charge of selecting, appointing, promoting, transferring, suspending or removing judges. Some of those respondents stated that those functions were carried out by other authorities in their countries.26 B. General mission 32. The responses to the questionnaire show that the main objective of most judicial councils is to safeguard the independence of the judicial system and the independence of individual judges. 33. Judicial councils also have another general objective, namely to promote the efficiency and quality of justice. This objective is closely linked to the strengthening of judicial independence, since the transfer of administrative functions to a judicial council independent of the executive power limits external interference in the administration of justice. 34. In many European countries, including those in which judicial councils originated, the improvement of administrative management was not included in the functions of these bodies and remained in the hands of the Ministry of Justice. On the contrary, the improvement of administrative management and control over the judicial budget and personnel constituted the main reason for the establishment of judicial councils in some northern European countries (e.g. Denmark and Sweden), as well as in a number of Latin American countries.27 35. The third objective that the establishment of a judicial council aims to achieve is that of striking a balance between judicial independence and self-administration, on the one hand, and the accountability of judges and the judiciary, on the other. Regional standards on the independence of the judiciary recommend that judicial councils or similar independent bodies be entrusted with responsibility for holding judges accountable for their conduct. This competence is reflected in many of the responses to the questionnaire.28 36. In order to avoid the excessive concentration of powers in one judicial body or the perception of corporatism, some regional standards specifically recommend the establishment of different independent bodies competent for specific aspects of judicial administration — such as selection, promotion and training of judges, discipline, professional evaluation and budget — without subjecting them to the control of a single institution or authority.29 The existence of different self-governing institutions in charge of different aspects of a judicial career was highlighted in a number of the contributions received.30 37. The Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary require States to allocate adequate resources to the judiciary in order to enable it to function properly (principle 7). The same principle applies, mutatis mutandis, to judicial councils. While they are not per se judicial authorities and do not exercise judicial functions, their function as a watchdog regarding the autonomy and independence of the judiciary require that judicial councils are independent and impartial from the executive and legislative branches of powers. For those reasons, judicial councils should be provided with adequate human and financial resources to perform their functions independently and autonomously. In particular, they should have their own premises, a secretariat and a sufficient number of qualified staff to carry out their functions. 26 27 28 29 30 8 Czechia and Germany. Autheman and Elena, Global Best Practices, p. 3. E.g. Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Croatia, Georgia, Mauritania, Morocco, Portugal and Togo. See the Kyiv Recommendations on Judicial Independence, para. 2. E.g. Jordan, Latvia and Malta.