A/HRC/38/38 involvement of members of the executive branch of power (Head of State, Minister of Justice or any other representative of the political authorities) in the disciplinary body is de facto incompatible with the principle of the independence of the judiciary. 62. In order to guarantee a fair disciplinary procedure, some international standards expressly provide that the competence to receive disciplinary complaints and conduct disciplinary investigations and the competence to adjudicate cases of judicial discipline should be vested in separate branches of a judicial council or in different authorities.58 63. Disciplinary proceedings should provide the accused judges with all the procedural guarantees set out in article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including the right to defend themselves in person or with the assistance of a legal counsel of their choice. Decisions of the disciplinary body should be reasoned and subject to appeal before a competent court. 64. Some of the responses to the questionnaire show that the responsibility for disciplinary proceedings against judges is vested in the judicial council 59 or equivalent independent body.60 In other countries, all disciplinary proceedings are handled by domestic courts,61 while in others domestic courts only deal with disciplinary proceedings against justices of the highest courts.62 65. Some of the mechanisms used at the national level to suspend or remove judges raise concerns in the light of existing standards concerning the independence of the judiciary. In Hungary, for example, the right to decide upon the dismissal of a judge lies with the President of the Republic. In Liberia, judges may be removed by the Parliament, and the National Bar Association may de facto suspend a judge from office by withdrawing his or her licence to practise law. VI. Composition of judicial councils 66. There is no standard model that a democratic country is bound to follow in setting up its judicial council, so long as its composition is such as to guarantee its independence and to enable it to carry out its functions effectively.63 However, there is a tendency at the international level for judicial councils to have a mixed composition, and for a majority of members to be judges elected by their peers. 67. A mixed composition “would present the advantages both of avoiding the perception of self-interest, self-protection and cronyism and of reflecting the different viewpoints within society, thus providing the judiciary with an additional source of legitimacy”.64 It reduces the risk of a sort of esprit de corps that may affect its decision-making process. Those responsible for the administration of justice extend beyond judges and magistrates. 68. When the composition of the council is mixed, it is desirable that a fair balance is struck between members of the judiciary and other ex officio or elected members. If the proportion of judges is too high, this could create “a risk of corporatism and insulate the council from any external oversight”.65 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 See opinion No. 10 of the Consultative Council of European Judges, para. 64; and the Kyiv Recommendations on Judicial Independence, paras. 5 and 26. E.g. in Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Croatia, Georgia, Mauritania, Morocco, Portugal and Togo. Office of the Disciplinary Counsel (Bosnia and Herzegovina); Committee for Judges and Magistrates (Malta); Judicial Disciplinary Committee (Republic of Korea); and the National Disciplinary Offence Board (Sweden). Bosnia and Herzegovina, Costa Rica, Czechia, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Jordan, Lithuania, Nepal, Norway, Philippines, Poland and Northern Ireland. Sweden. See Venice Commission, opinion No. 403/2006 on judicial appointments, para. 23. See opinion No. 10 of the Consultative Council of European Judges, para. 19. See, for example, Venice Commission, opinion No. 779/2014 on the seven amendments to the Constitution of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” concerning, in particular, the Judicial 13