A/HRC/38/38 Commission considers that, in order to avoid possible corporatist tendencies within the council, it would be preferable for the Chair to be elected among the non-judicial members of the council. In a number of mission reports, the Special Rapporteur recommended that the presidency of the council should be exercised by one of its judge members (see, for example, A/HRC/23/43/Add.1, para. 113 (a)). Both the Special Rapporteur and the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights have expressed the view that the Chief Justice or President of the Supreme Court should not be appointed as the Chair of a judicial council (see, for example, A/HRC/17/30/Add.3, para. 94 (i)).83 81. The responses to the questionnaire show that State practice relating to the appointment of the Chair of a judicial council is extremely heterogeneous. In some parliamentary systems, the President of the Republic or the Head of State is Chair of the council.84 In another group of countries, the Chair is appointed by the council itself among its members.85 In some cases, the Minister of Justice is Chair,86 often with no right to vote; whereas in others, legislation expressly provides that the Minister cannot be elected as president of the council.87 In some countries, the Chief Justice or President of the Supreme Court is also the Chair of the council, and holds both positions simultaneously.88 82. There are no established principles in regional mechanisms concerning the number of members of judicial councils and the duration of their mandates. These matters are left to the discretion of States, which should define the number of councillors and the duration of their mandates taking into account, inter alia, the size of their judicial systems and, consequently, the number of tasks to be carried out. Similarly, it is up to States to decide whether members of the council should sit as full-time or part-time members. 83. One of the responsibilities of judicial councils is to protect judges from external political influence. In order to guarantee the continuity of a council’s functions, its members should not be replaced at the same time or renewed following parliamentary elections. In particular, it would be inconsistent with the principle of the independence of the judiciary to allow for a complete renewal of the composition of a judicial council following parliamentary elections. In his country mission to Poland, the Special Rapporteur expressed the view that the early termination of all the judicial members of the Council would lead to the creation of a new National Council of the Judiciary dominated by political appointees, in breach of existing standards on the independence of the judiciary and the separation of powers (see A/HRC/38/38/Add.1, para. 70). VII. Conclusions 84. Judicial councils play an essential role in guaranteeing the independence and the autonomy of the judiciary. The underlying rationale for their creation is the need to insulate the judiciary and judicial career processes from external political pressure, mainly from the executive branch. In addition to their primary function of safeguarding judicial independence, a growing number of judicial councils have been entrusted with far-reaching powers to promote the efficiency and quality of justice and rationalize the administration of justice, court management and budgeting. 85. The Special Rapporteur has shown that there is no one-size-fits-all model of judicial council. Each judicial governing body originates from a legal system with distinct historical, cultural and social roots; the specific role of each body varies from one country to the other, in accordance with the specific problems that its establishment is supposed to address. In the present report, the Special Rapporteur has shown that the number of judicial councils has increased greatly in recent decades: current estimates suggest that more than 83 84 85 86 87 88 16 See also the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Guarantees for the independence of justice operators”, para. 246. Algeria, Italy and Malta. Montenegro and Slovenia. Bulgaria and Turkey. Montenegro. Denmark, Nepal, Oman, Philippines, Portugal, Togo and Northern Ireland.