A/HRC/38/38 38. In most countries that responded to the questionnaire, the judicial council has its own budget and dedicated personnel. In a few cases, human and financial resources necessary to the judicial council to perform its functions are provided by the court administration31 or the Ministry of Justice.32 C. Establishment 39. A number of human rights mechanisms and bodies — including the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (see paras. 17 and 26 above) — have recommended the establishment of an independent judicial council. 40. The position of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) is more nuanced. In an opinion on judicial appointments, the Commission noted that a variety of different systems for judicial appointment exists in Europe, and that there is not a single model that would apply to all countries. In older democracies, the executive power has sometimes a decisive influence on judicial appointments. These systems have worked well in practice and have allowed for an independent judiciary because the executive is restrained by legal culture and traditions. New democracies, however, have not had a chance to develop these traditions. At least in these countries, the Commission recommends that States that have not yet done so consider the establishment of an independent judicial council to prevent political abuse in the appointment of the judiciary.33 41. In order to guarantee their independence from the executive and legislative powers and ensure effective self-governance to the judiciary, some — but not all — regional standards recommend that judicial councils “be positioned at the constitutional level in those countries having a written Constitution, or in the equivalent basic law or constitutional instrument in other countries”.34 42. Establishing a judicial council through a constitutional provision emphasizes the vital role that such a council plays as a guarantor of judicial independence, especially in countries that are in the process of consolidating democratic institutions. A constitutional provision would grant the newly-created institution “the legitimacy of constitutional recognition and may help insulate it from interferences from the executive, legislative or judiciary through legislation, decrees or rulings”. 35 The Constitution should include provisions relating to the setting up of such body, its composition and the definition of its functions, as well as its autonomy vis-à-vis the executive and legislative branches of power. Considering that judicial councils do not belong to the hierarchy of the court system and cannot as such decide on the merits of the cases, the Constitution should also regulate relations with the courts, and especially with judges.36 43. In the majority of States that responded to the questionnaire, the Constitution contains specific provisions concerning the establishment of a judicial council.37 In some cases, the composition, powers and autonomy of the council are regulated by ordinary law.38 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 Norway. Mauritania. See Venice Commission, opinion No. 403/2006 on judicial appointments, 22 June 2007, paras. 44– 48. See opinion No. 10 of the Consultative Council of European Judges, para. 11. Autheman and Elena, Global Best Practices, p. 7. See opinion No. 10 of the Consultative Council of European Judges, para. 13. Argentina, Bahrain, El Salvador, Mauritania, Mongolia, Nepal, Poland, Slovenia and Turkey. Belgium, Jordan, Montenegro, Norway, Paraguay and Sweden. 9