A/HRC/38/38 and appointing the members of such a body” (see A/HRC/11/41, para. 29). The application of these criteria seeks to avoid, as far as possible, the politicization of judicial councils, as political control of these institutions would ultimately lead towards the opposite effect to that intended — namely, a deterioration of judicial independence. Selection and appointment methods must prevent factual powers and networks with particular and/or hidden agendas from controlling or influencing the decision-making process, guaranteeing full transparency so as to generate awareness of this risk. 76. The selection of judge members of judicial councils can be done through elections or, for a limited number of members (such as the President of the Supreme Court or court of appeal), ex officio. It is for the State authorities to develop appropriate selection procedures guaranteeing the widest representation of the judiciary at all levels. In order to insulate judicial councils from external interference, politicization and undue pressure, international standards discourage the involvement of political authorities, such as parliament, or the executive at any stage of the selection process. The interference of the judicial hierarchies in the process should also be avoided. 77. The responses to the questionnaire show that States have developed different procedures for the selection of judge members of judicial councils. In most cases, judge members are elected by their peers. However, in some countries, judge members are elected by the President of the Republic74 or the legislative75 or executive branch.76 78. Regional instruments provide limited guidance with regard to the selection of nonjudge members. This is a matter that has largely been left to the discretion of States, which have to strike a fair balance between the need to insulate the judiciary from external pressure and the need to avoid the negative effects of corporatism within the judiciary.77 As a general rule, non-judge members should not be appointed by the executive branch; it is also preferable that they are not appointed by the legislative branch. If elected by parliament, regional standards provide that non-judge members should be elected by a qualified majority, necessitating significant opposition support.78 79. The responses to the questionnaire show that, in many countries, the appointment of non-judge members is carried out by the legislative bodies,79 often by a qualified majority. In other countries, lay members are formally elected by the Head of State 80 or by the executive branch.81 In some countries, for example in Peru, non-judge members are elected by non-political authorities, such as the Bar Association, professional associations and universities. Chair of a judicial council 80. With regard to the selection of the Chair of a judicial council, both the Consultative Council of European Judges and the Venice Commission recommend that he or she be an impartial person who is not close to political parties.82 In parliamentary systems in which the President or Head of State has only formal powers, it is considered permissible to appoint the Head of State as the Chair of the council. However, there are different approaches as regards the selection of the Chair in other systems, such as semi-presidential systems. In general terms, the Consultative Council of European Judges recommends that the Chair should be elected by the council itself and should be a judge, whereas the Venice 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 Turkey. Poland and Serbia. Denmark and Sweden. See Venice Commission, opinion No. 403/2006 on judicial appointments, para. 27. See opinion No. 10 of the Consultative Council of European Judges, para. 32; and Venice Commission, opinion No. 403/2006 on judicial appointments, para. 32. E.g. Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Italy, Mauritania, Montenegro, Portugal, Serbia, Slovakia (three members), Slovenia, Sweden and Turkey. Algeria, Georgia (one member), Portugal (two members), Slovakia (three members) and Togo. Denmark, Estonia and Slovakia (three members). See opinion No. 10 of the Consultative Council of European Judges, para. 33; and Venice Commission, opinion No. 403/2006 on judicial appointments, para. 35. 15