A/HRC/38/33 of an economic nature, IMF is precluded from using its powers for political objectives”.21 That division of the IMF universe into matters that are either economic or political goes to the core of the problem of locating issues such as social protection, which are both economic and political but much else besides. In practice, the Legal Department seems not to have used its considerable influence to restrict or inhibit the developments described below, even though they amount to a major reinterpretation of the Articles and of the range of issues that may be considered to be within the mandate of IMF. 15. Policy evolution has been reflected mainly through “operational guidance”.22 A 2015 Guidance Note on Surveillance specifies that, while exchange rate, monetary, fiscal and financial sector policies are always expected to be covered by IMF surveillance, other issues are only to be assessed if they are macro-critical, which means that the issue “affects, or has the potential, to affect domestic or external stability, or global stability”. 23 Little additional guidance is offered and IMF staff are encouraged to “exercise judgment”, and to note that “there is scope … to innovate and push the analytical content beyond current practices”.24 There has indeed been much innovation, with account being taken of policies relating to jobs and growth, infrastructure, labour markets, social safety nets, public sector enterprises, governance, gender and climate change.25 The position in practice appears to be that, where there is a will, and provided an issue is not problematically politically contentious, it can be treated as being macro-critical, thus falling within the mandate of IMF. 16. In the lending context, staff also enjoy “broad latitude” 26 when assessing the “criticality” of conditions imposed.27 This applies in relation to issues within the “core areas of expertise” of IMF, but also outside that core provided that the determination of criticality is accompanied by “detailed explanations … along with a strong justification”.28 For noncore issues, staff are urged to draw, as far as possible, on the expertise of “other multilateral institutions, particularly the World Bank”.29 III. Mandate flexibility in practice 17. Before focusing on how the potentially very flexible notion of macro-criticality has been approached in practice in relation to social protection, it is instructive to consider the macro-criticality of human rights, military expenditure, corruption, inequality and gender equality. The present analysis shows that the sole taboo at IMF seems to be human rights, although IMF analyses do in fact note the relevance of political conflict, violence and social unrest. A. Human rights taboo 18. IMF has not adopted an official legal opinion in relation to human rights. When asked about its legal position, it points to a paper written in 2002 by Mr. Gianviti, and subsequently published in an academic volume. 30 The Special Rapporteur was informed that nothing had been published since then, either officially or as an academic paper, by any member of the sizeable Legal Department with any bearing on the approach of IMF to human rights. Mr. Gianviti’s paper, although never officially endorsed by IMF and written 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 6 See www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/022210.pdf. While operational guidance is produced by staff and not endorsed by the Executive Board, both surveillance and conditionality guidance notes are discussed and approved by the Board. IMF, “Guidance Note for Surveillance under Article IV” (May 2015), p. 36. Ibid, Executive Summary. Ibid, p. 39. Abrams, “The IMF’s Role in Social Protection”, p. 6. IMF, “Revised Operational Guidance to IMF Staff on the 2002 Conditionality Guidelines” (August 2014). Ibid, p. 10. Ibid. Gianviti, “Economic, Social, and Cultural Human Rights”, p. 113.