A/HRC/32/38 Governments are also increasingly flagging content on social media as inappropriate under a platform’s terms of service, in order to prompt the company to remove the content or deactivate an account. Filtering 46. States often block and filter content with the assistance of the private sector. Internet service providers may block access to specific keywords, web pages or entire websites. On platforms that host content, the type of filtering technique depends on the nature of the platform and the content in question. Domain name registrars may refuse to register those that match a government blacklist; social media companies may remove postings or suspend accounts; search engines may take down search results that link to illegal content. The method of restriction required by Governments or employed by companies can raise both necessity and proportionality concerns, depending on the validity of the rationale cited for the removal and the risk of removal of legal or protected expression. 47. Ambiguities in State regulation coupled with onerous intermediary liability obligations could result in excessive filtering. Even if content regulations werevalidly enacted and enforced, users may still experience unnecessary access restrictions. For example, content filtering in one jurisdiction may affect the digital expression of users in other jurisdictions. While companies may configure filters to apply only to a particular jurisdiction or region, there have been instances where they were nevertheless passed on to other networks or areas of the platform. For instance, in 2013 State-mandated filtering carried out by Airtel India led to restrictions on the same content on several networks in Oman belonging to its partner, Omantel. 29 Network or service shutdowns 48. Service shutdowns and associated restrictions are a particularly pernicious means of enforcing content regulations. Such measures are frequently justified on the basis of national security, the maintenance of public order or the prevention of public unrest. In 2015, the Special Rapporteur, together with representatives of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Organization of American States and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights condemned as unlawful Internet “kill switches”.30 In one year alone, there were reports of shutdowns in Bangladesh, Brazil, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, India and Pakistan. 31 The Special Rapporteur confirmed instances of telecommunication service provider and service shutdowns in Tajikistan, during his official visit in March 2016.32 Non-neutral networks 49. In addition to refraining from unnecessary and disproportionate restrictions on digital access, States also have a duty to ensure a free and open Internet. Network neutrality is the principle that all Internet data, content and services be treated equally and without improper discrimination. However, Internet service providers may deploy technologies that speed up or otherwise favour access to certain content and services, while slowing down others (a practice also known as “throttling”). The growing number of collaborations between Internet service providers and content-hosting platforms that offer free wireless data to access online content or services provided by the latter (also known as the provision of “zero rated” services) has attracted controversy. While such measures detract from the 29 30 31 32 Citizen Lab, “Routing gone wild: documenting upstream filtering in Oman via India” (2012). Joint declaration on freedom of expression and responses to conflict situations (2015). Submission of Institute for Human Rights and Business at 3. Preliminary observations by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. David Kaye at the end of his visit to Tajikistan (9 March 2016). 13