A/HRC/45/7 48. The same approach has been taken by the European Union and the United Kingdom53 since 17 May 2019 in response to serious or attempted cyberattacks, understood as actions involving: access to information systems, information systems interference, data interference or data interception.54 Both have introduced visa and entrance prohibitions and requested the freezing of assets of listed persons or the refusal to make assets or funds available to them. 49. The introduction of sanctions in response to cyberattacks has aggravated the existing problem of targeted sanctions when punishment is decided and imposed by executive bodies in the absence of court hearings and due process guarantees. Reference to cyberthreats makes the acquisition and disclosure of evidence problematic and all allegations rather ill-founded. The scope of individuals and legal entities targeted by such sanctions is expanding. 50. Cybertechnologies are also influencing the scope of private entities involved in the implementation of sanctions regimes. In particular, the United States Cyber-Related Sanctions Regulations impose special obligations on United States persons facilitating or engaging in online commerce.55 They correspond to and reflect therefore the emergence of a new type of sanction besides economic, financial, political and other kinds of sanctions – cybersanctions. 51. The Special Rapporteur notes that software can also be qualified as a commodity today. As a result, trade in software can also be limited as part of a sanctions regime. For example, the Islamic Republic of Iran, in its letter dated 12 March 2020 addressed to the Secretary-General, refers to its inability to buy and install up-to-date flight planning software because of United States sanctions. Moreover, no person whose property and interests in property have been blocked can export or re-export software to Crimea, making the list of available technologies limited. Services and software cannot be used for commercial Internet services, connectivity etc. 56 or even for non-commercial activities such as those carried out using Zoom or other educational platforms that may be directly prescribed in the service agreements or prescribed by United States legislation.57 United States-registered companies also block social media accounts as a part of the Magnitsky sanctions regime.58 52. The Special Rapporteur underscores that the contemporary system does not provide for a comprehensive mechanism for the protection of human rights and for accountability and redress for those whose rights have been violated by unilateral sanctions. Existing mechanisms provide only for the possibility of diplomatic protection by States, as in the case of Qatar when it instituted proceedings before the International Court of Justice, 59 the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 60 the Universal Postal Union (UPU) 61 and through individual appeals to regional courts (in particular, the European 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 10 Until 31 December 2020, the United Kingdom will apply the European Union cybersanctions. See https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/813 212/HM_Treasury_Notice__CA_regime.pdf. Council Regulation (EU) 2019/796 of 17 May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against cyberattacks threatening the Union or its Member States, art. 1 (1)–(2); Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 of 17 May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States, arts. 1, 4 and 5. United States, Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Cyber-Related Sanctions Regulations. United States, Executive Order 13685, general license No. 9, “Exportation of certain services and software incident to Internet-based communications authorized”, para. (d). Zoom terms of service effective 13 April 2020, para. 12. See https://zoom.us/terms. Donie O’Sullivan and Artemis Moshtaghian, “Instagram says it’s removing posts supporting Soleimani to comply with US sanctions”, CNN Business, 13 January 2020; Jonny Tickle, “Chechen leader Kadyrov banned from Instagram again, loses account with 1.4 million followers”, RT, 13 May 2020. See www.icj-cij.org/en/case/172. Judgement of 14 July 2020 https://www.icj-cij.org/files/caserelated/173/173-20200714-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf See www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CERD/Pages/InterstateCommunications.aspx. “Qatar’s resolution on postal services gets UPU backing”, Gulf Times, 29 February 2020