A/HRC/45/7 36. Appendix A to Part 501 of the Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines of the United States provides for civil monetary penalties of up to US$ 289,239 or criminal penalties of up to US$ 1,000,000, imprisonment for up to 20 years or both upon conviction. As a result, even in situations when humanitarian exemptions are applicable, natural and legal entities like banks, ships etc. are reluctant to be involved in transactions for fear of responsibility24 that results in overcompliance with already massive sanctions regimes. It has been reported, in particular, that in March 2020 a Chinese businessman announced the donation to Cuba of 100,000 masks, 10,000 kits for the rapid detection of the virus responsible for COVID-19, ventilators, gloves and medical protective suits. The shipment could not reach its final destination, however, as the hired carrier, a United States company, declined at the last minute to deliver the goods, citing United States regulations. 25 37. The Special Rapporteur recalls that sanctions that were supposed to be exceptional even when introduced by the Security Council tend to become entrenched in time and scope and turn into the norm rather than being the legally grounded exception. As a result, some unilateral sanctions regimes, unlike sanctions introduced by the Security Council, are not limited in time. Sanctions regimes are introduced or remain in force even if all targeted individuals and entities have been delisted. Reportedly, such sanction regimes establish uncertainties in commercial interactions and have inadvertent detrimental effects on national economies. 38. While the Special Rapporteur welcomes the efforts of targeting States to introduce 26 and update humanitarian exemption mechanisms, 27 she notes with concern that humanitarian exemptions and mechanisms to supply humanitarian aid are usually complex and confusing. In particular, the factsheet issued by the United States on the provision of humanitarian assistance and trade to combat COVID-19 28 is informational but does not carry the force of law nor does it supersede the actual legal provisions cited. Targeted Governments insist that such humanitarian exemptions are costly and nearly non-existent. 39. The Special Rapporteur notes that the grounds for and purposes of sanctions have also changed. According to the developers of the Global Sanctions Database, more than 40 per cent of the sanctions introduced today aim to pursue the enhancement of democracy, human rights protection and other similar purposes,29 rather than to address threats to peace, breaches of peace or acts of aggression or to respond to violations of erga omnes obligations.30 Nearly all of these sanctions are taken by States and regional organizations unilaterally. 40. The proliferation of so-called “Magnitsky sanctions” provides a clear illustration of this point. The Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 adopted by the United States imposed financial sanctions and entry bans on “certain persons related to the detention, abuse, and death of Sergei Magnitsky or responsible for certain gross violations of human rights in the Russian Federation”. As at 8 May 2020, 54 individuals and 1 entity 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 Phyllis Bennis, “Sanctions in the era of pandemic”, Al Jazeera, 12 May 2020. See www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25848&LangID=E; Yisell Rodríguez Milán, “La historia no contada de cómo un avión con suministros médicos desde China no ha podido entrar a Cuba”, Gramma, 1 April 2020 (in Spanish). Council of the European Union, “Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)”, paras. 25–28. See www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Programs/Documents/covid19_factsheet_20200416.pdf; https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/internationalrelations/sanctions_en. See www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Programs/Documents/covid19_factsheet_20200416.pdf. See http://globalsanctionsdatabase.com/. See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 3, at p. 32. See also Bruno Simma, “Does the UN Charter provide an adequate legal basis for individual or collective responses to violations of obligations erga omnes?” in The Future of International Law Enforcement: New Scenarios – New Law?, Jost Delbruck, ed. (Berlin, Duncker and Humblot, 1993), pp. 126–127; Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, para. 2. 7