A/HRC/23/43 36. In the first case, the obligation to provide legal aid to those who lack sufficient financial means to pay for these services stems from article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 2, subparagraphs 3 (a) and (b) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which recognize the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights set out in international treaties, the Constitution or the law. 37. In the latter case, the obligation derives from article 14, paragraph 1 of the International Covenant, which recognizes the right to a fair trial in cases regarding the determination of the rights and obligations of individuals in a suit at law. In its general comment No. 32 (2007), the Human Rights Committee noted that the concept of “suit at law” was based on the nature of the rights in question rather than on the status of one of the parties or the particular forum provided by domestic legal systems for the determination of particular rights.15 The concept encompasses (a) judicial procedures aimed at determining rights and obligations pertaining to the areas of contract, property and torts in the area of private law, and (b) equivalent notions in the area of administrative law, such as the termination of employment of civil servants or the determination of their social security benefits. 38. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has adopted a similar position. Although article 6 of the European Convention does not expressly require States to provide free legal assistance in civil matters, the Court found such an obligation in article 6, paragraph 1, in its guarantee of access to the courts, holding that “indigent applicants are entitled to free counsel when such assistance is indispensable for effective access to the courts and a fair hearing”. In Airey v. Ireland, the Court found a violation of article 6 (1) where the applicant was unable to obtain a judicial separation from her husband without legal assistance. The Court found that she had effectively been denied access to the courts, highlighting the complexity of the proceedings and the fact that marital disputes often entail emotional involvement that is scarcely compatible with the degree of objectivity required for advocacy in court. 39. The right to legal aid is subject to two conditions. First, the beneficiary must lack “sufficient means” to pay for legal aid services. Existing human rights treaties contain no definition of “sufficient means”, and there is no case law indicating the level or kind of private means that may be taken into account when deciding whether to award legal aid. 16 Second, in criminal proceedings, legal aid should be provided “where the interests of justice so require”. The interests of justice take into consideration a number of factors, such as what is at stake for the applicant in terms of the seriousness of the offence and hence the possible sentence that could result from it. In cases involving capital punishment, the Human Rights Committee stated that “it is axiomatic that the accused must be effectively assisted by a lawyer at all stages of the proceedings”. 17 The more complicated the case is on the law or the facts, the more likely that legal aid is required, although due regard must be given to the capacity of the accused to defend himself. 40. Counsel provided by the competent authorities must be effective in the representation of the beneficiary of legal aid. As the Human Rights Committee pointed out, “blatant misbehaviour or incompetence, for example the withdrawal of an appeal without consultation in a death penalty case, or absence during the hearing of a witness in such cases may entail the responsibility of the State concerned for a violation of article 14, 15 16 17 8 CCPR/C/GC/32, para. 16. David Harris, Michael O‟Boyle and Colin Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, second edition (New York, Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 317. CCPR/C/GC/32, para. 38.