A/HRC/32/39 “necessary” to shoot a fleeing thief if that is the only way to stop him or her from escaping, in an objective cause-and-effect assessment. However, thus injuring the thief would not be “proportionate”, because it would amount to an excessively harmful means of stopping a comparatively minor crime (a value judgment). 91. In some jurisdictions, such as the United States, every citizen, including private security personnel, has the right to make an arrest in certain circumstances. However, importantly, a citizen’s arrest must always be made at the arrester’s own risk: if the arrest proves unlawful, the arrester is subject to criminal or civil liability. In all circumstances, the amount of force that can lawfully be used in making an arrest largely depends on the type of offence, but the general rule is that force cannot exceed the extent of resistance offered. 92. On account of their organized character, and the training that, as a matter of regulation, they must have received, those using force as part of a private security provider should be subjected to stricter scrutiny than other members of the public as to whether they have met the legal standards. In that context, the Special Rapporteur is concerned that the existence of Stand Your Ground laws can give licence for private security providers and other essentially private entities to seek out confrontation where safe retreat is a viable option, and as such are not in accordance with the precautionary principle (see, for example, CCPR/C/USA/CO/4, para. 10). 93. That organizational characteristic implies that those high up a chain of command or authority, including those not present at the event in question, can potentially be held accountable for use of force by private security personnel. The different level and mechanisms of accountability for such abuses are discussed below. F. Particular contexts and challenges 94. Having discussed the nature of the standards that can be applied to private security providers in a law enforcement setting, in the present section the Special Rapporteur addresses certain contexts in which the use of force by private security providers can be particularly problematic. 1. Private security providers and detention 95. States are increasingly making use of private security providers as part of their correctional services. A 2013 report found that in at least 11 countries, there was some form of prison privatization, with detention services provided by private security providers for 8 per cent of the prison population in the United States and 19 per cent in Australia.31 96. In 2001, the Bureau of Justice Assistance of the United States identified the use of force as a potential reason not to privatize detention facilities, owing to the uncertainties around the deprivation of liberty and the preservation of the rights of inmates when private entities are involved.32 31 32 See C. Mason, International growth trends in prison privatization (Washington, DC, The Sentencing Project, 2013). Available from http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_International%20Growth%20Trends%20in%20Pris on%20Privatization.pdf. See J. Austin and G. Coventry, “Emerging issues on privatized prisons”, Bureau of Justice Assistance, February 2001. Available from www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/181249.pdf. 15