A/HRC/30/45 important task for the mandate. There is in this regard a difference in views among Member States as to whether source countries should simply put “an immediate end to unilateral coercive measures”, which is the view of target countries and developing countries at large, or whether such measures should remain a key component of foreign policy that at best requires a small adjustment to mitigate their adverse human rights impacts, which is the view of most source countries. This difference in views finds expression in the polarized voting pattern that has prevailed so far in the adoption of resolutions pertaining to unilateral coercive measures. For developing States, adopting guidelines should not signify a recognition of the legitimacy of such measures as a tool of foreign policy, a position they do not countenance. For the source countries, mostly advanced States, of which one group has indeed adopted exhaustive guidelines, the issue might signify no more than sharing such guidelines with others. 54. The Special Rapporteur will seek to promote, through appropriate recommendations, a consensual approach in this regard, giving priority to pragmatic options that can effectively prevent, minimize and redress the adverse impact of unilateral coercive measures on vulnerable groups on the ground. D. Review and evaluation of mechanisms for assessment and redress 55. The Special Rapporteur will also review existing independent mechanisms set up to assess the adverse impacts of unilateral coercive measures and adjudicatory procedures to permit redress or reparations of aggrieved parties, and will seek to identify best practices and next practices, having in view the necessity to promote the accountability of source countries and the credibility of impact assessment in target countries. 56. In order to mirror in the approach to unilateral coercive measures, progress achieved in respect of United Nations sanctions policy, the Special Rapporteur will review ongoing work in this regard by the High-level Review of United Nations Sanctions and the Interagency Working Group on United Nations Sanctions, as well as the lessons to be learned from the Interlaken Process on Financial Sanctions,41 the Bonn/Berlin Process on the Design and Implementation of Arms Embargoes and Travel and Aviation related Sanctions,42 the Stockholm Process on Making Targeted Sanctions Effective- Guidelines for the Implementation of United Nations Policy Options43 and the Greek Process on Enhancing the Implementation of United Nations Sanctions.44 41 42 43 44 16 Swiss Confederation, United Nations Secretariat and Watson Institute for Strategic Studies at Brown University, ��Targeted Financial Sanctions: A Manual for Design and Implementation – Contributions from the Interlaken Process” (Providence, Rhode Island, Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, 2001). Available from www.eda.admin.ch/content/dam/eda/en/documents/home/Handbuchzu-gezielten-Finanzsanktionen_EN.pdf. M. Brzoska (ed.), “Design and Implementation of the Arms Embargoes and Travel and Aviation Related Sanctions: Results of the ʻBonn-Berlin Processʼ” (Bonn, Bonn International Centre for Conversion, 2001). Available from www.watsoninstitute.org/tfs/CD/booklet_sanctions.pdf. P. Wallensteen, C. Staibano and M. Eriksson (eds.), Making Targeted Sanctions Effective: Guidelines for the Implementation of United Nations Policy Options (Uppsala, Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2003). Available from www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/LExternal-publications/2003/2003%20Uppsala%20Targeted%20sanctions%20effective.pdf. S/2007/734, annex.