A/HRC/37/311721424 satisfactory manner. For regional mechanisms, the Special Rapporteur referred to the example of European courts. Sanctions by the European Union were subject to full judicial review before the European Court of Justice. He emphasized how the courts had developed, over time, a rich jurisprudence of cases brought by individuals or entities subject to restrictive measures. In some cases, applicants had obtained delisting from sanctions. The European Court of Human Rights was also competent to adjudicate cases brought by individuals or legal entities for violations of the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Court had already considered cases on sanctions, albeit in a more limited manner. Its jurisdiction was limited to the territory of Member States or over which the latter exercised control. 13. For international mechanisms, the Special Rapporteur discussed the treaty-based human rights bodies of the United Nations. Some of these mechanisms were, prima facie, relevant to the situation of persons whose human rights had been infringed by sanctions. Such mechanisms were, however, not available when the States imposing the sanctions were not party to the relevant instrument. He argued for targeting State accountability and liability for damages. States had not only obligations when they adopted measures applicable to their own territory, but also extraterritorial obligations insofar as the actions of the State could have an influence on situations abroad. A State imposing sanctions should therefore be liable for any resulting human rights violations. 14. Although a treaty body could render a decision with regard to remedial action to be taken by a State, such as compensation to victims, their decisions were not legally binding on targeting States. Complaints of violations of human rights caused by the application of unilateral coercive measures may also be submitted to the special procedures of the Human Rights Council, or to its complaint procedure mechanism. 15. The Special Rapporteur concluded by suggesting that a compensation commission could be set up under the Security Council or, alternatively, be established by means of a multilateral convention. States that had imposed unilateral coercive measures on other States could be called upon to contribute financially to such a commission. 16. The Vice-Rector and Head of the International Law Department at the International University MITSO, Alena Douhan, argued that the impact of unilateral coercive measures was similar to that of other threats to international peace and security, leading to negative effects and even the destabilization of progress in the peaceful social and economic development of peoples around the world. The debate on remedies, however, first required a clear definition of what unlawful unilateral coercive measures actually were, taking into account not only the mechanisms used but also their consequences and purposes, as well as immediate and long-term responses. 17. Ms. Douhan proposed the reactivation of the fact-finding mechanisms of the Security Council and the General Assembly as a response to unilateral coercive measures. She also suggested making active use of the special procedures and other mechanisms of the Human Rights Council, such as the treaty bodies and the complaint procedure. 18. With regard to immediate responses to unilateral coercive measures applied to natural and legal persons, an individual or a legal entity should have the right to appeal to a national court, which could assess the legality of the measures and decide, if applicable, on the most appropriate criminal or administrative penalty. If the targeted individual or legal entity is acquitted of the charges that triggered unilateral coercive measures, the State of habitual residence of that individual or legal entity would be empowered to request the cessation of the measures, which would have to be lifted immediately. In all cases, the natural or legal entity targeted by the measures would have the right to stand trial, with the observance of other due process guarantees. 19. Long-term responses to unilateral coercive measures should inevitably include the drafting of a clear definition of such measures, and of criteria upon which activities could be judged as illegal. The lack of a definition opened the way for misuse by both sanctioning and sanctioned States. Therefore, if the means of pressure applied by a State were legal under international law, they would not constitute unilateral coercive measures and could not constitute grounds for accountability or reparations. 4