A/HRC/6/21 page 6 common application of objective criteria for the submission of candidatures would level out differences in respect of the electing bodies, without having to resort to a lengthy signing and ratification process. 14. The Government of Mauritius indicated that it was in favour of aligning the legal status of the CESCR with that of other treaty monitoring bodies. 15. The Government of Mexico noted that the modification of the legal status of CESCR was consistent with the universality, interdependence and interrelatedness of all human rights, and underlined that the modification of the legal status should be made with the strict aim of making consistent the political and juridical recognition of the equal importance of the rights recognized in the two international Covenants on human rights, without reducing or negatively affecting the functions and work already developed by the CESCR. 16. The Government of Pakistan indicated that it fully supported efforts to rectify, in accordance with international law, the legal status of the CESCR with the aim of placing it on a par with all other treaty monitoring bodies. 17. The Government of Switzerland indicated that in its view it was not necessary at this stage to rectify the status of CESCR. The Committee had provided reliable and quality work for more than two decades and there was no indication that its different legal status had affected its authority or legitimacy. Neither was the Committee’s particular status - as a subsidiary organ of ECOSOC - necessarily a disadvantage, since the expenditures of the Committee were covered by the regular budget of the United Nations and did not depend on contributions from States parties. The moment chosen to examine this question was inopportune as it coincided with the negotiation of an optional protocol to the Covenant dealing with the modalities for an individual complaint procedure. Just as the modalities chosen to define the role of the CESCR in the oversight of an eventual optional protocol could lead to a reappraisal of the acquis of the Committee, the rectification of its status could result in similar risks. Moreover, Switzerland expressed the view that it was not for the Human Rights Council, but rather for the States parties to the Covenant, to emit an opinion on this issue. 18. The Government of Turkey indicated that it shared the concerns about the ambiguous status of the CESCR. Noting the element of legal uncertainty concerning the future of the Committee, as its current legal status depended on a resolution of ECOSOC, Turkey welcomed any initiative aiming at addressing existing deficiencies that caused concern about the protection and realization of human rights. 19. The Government of the United States of America indicated that the CESCR, having been established by an ECOSOC resolution, as a practical matter monitored implementation of the Covenant in a manner similar to the Human Rights Committee’s monitoring of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Government noted that if the goal was to give the Committee a legal status identical to other treaty monitoring bodies and nothing more, then such a change was unlikely to be worth the cost borne and effort required by the international community. There would be little or no practical consequences of “rectifying” the legal status, and there would be a significant risk of protracted negotiations and new legal complications and uncertainties. Moreover, the United States considered that the Human Rights Council was not the appropriate forum for advancing this issue, as the Council did not have jurisdiction to amend the