A/HRC/45/33 152. The human rights violations and crimes investigated by the mission and outlined in the present report give rise both to State responsibility and to individual criminal responsibility under domestic or international criminal law, or both. 153. The State, as primary duty holder of international human rights obligations, is responsible for all acts that are attributable to it and that constitute a violation of international obligations. In addition to the State’s obligation to prevent human rights violations and ensure accessible and effective remedies to individuals when they occur, the State’s failure to investigate and to bring to justice perpetrators of such violations itself gives rise to a separate breach of the international human rights obligations. A. Findings by context 154. With respect to violations against targeted political and military dissidents by intelligence services, the mission has recorded in its database the names of officers identified by victims as those directly responsible for the violations and crimes committed. The mission also has reasonable grounds to believe that high-level authorities within the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service and the Directorate General of Military Counter-intelligence either committed, ordered or contributed to violations, or they knew that subordinates were committing violations and, despite having the authority to prevent and repress them, failed to do so. 155. The individual responsibility of specific prosecutors or judges for violations or crimes, by acts or omissions, merits additional investigation. In certain cases, prosecutors and judges have played a direct role in cases that amount to arbitrary detentions. In addition, the judiciary has failed to act as a check on other State actors, perpetuating impunity for the violations and crimes committed. 156. In relation to violations and crimes committed during the Operations for People’s Liberation and the Operations for People’s Humane Liberation, the mission found that extrajudicial executions were committed by officers belonging to the military, police and intelligence, who acted jointly. The mission has reasonable grounds to believe that high-level officials in those institutions contributed to the commission of the documented crimes. In addition, the mission has reasonable grounds to believe that police and military superiors and commanders knew or should have known about the violations committed during operations and, having had effective command and control, failed to take adequate measures to prevent and repress them. 157. With regard to the Barlovento case, the mission has reasonable grounds to believe that the responsibility for the violations and crimes committed extends beyond those identified as responsible and charged by the Public Prosecutor’s Office. 158. Regarding extrajudicial executions committed by the National Bolivarian Police and its Special Action Forces, and the Scientific, Criminal and Criminological Investigator Corps, the mission has reasonable grounds to believe that certain high-level authorities had knowledge of and contributed to the commission of those crimes. It also has reasonable grounds to believe that others, in their roles as commanders and superiors, knew or should have known about those crimes, and having effective command and control, did not take measures to prevent or repress them. The responsibility of regional and State-level authorities within these forces correspond to the areas where they exercised effective authority and control. 159. Regarding human rights violations in the context of protests, in the cases investigated, the mission has collected information regarding individuals and units allegedly involved in the perpetration of arbitrary detentions; torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; and arbitrary deprivation of life, at various levels of the chain of command, including at the tactical, operational, strategic and political levels. The mission observes that more investigations would be necessary to identify specific individual responsibilities, especially at low- and mid-levels of authority and control. 18