A/HRC/45/33 The torture and ill-treatment were usually carried out within the first few days of detention, prior to initial court appearances, while detainees remained incommunicado. Many former detainees also witnessed the torture of other, non-political detainees in the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service’s facilities. 48. The acts were usually committed during interrogations to extract confessions or information, including phone and social media passwords, or to coerce detainees to incriminate themselves or others, particularly high-profile opposition leaders, in the commission of crimes. In the case of National Assembly deputy Juan Requesens, Bolivarian National Intelligence Service officials allegedly administered psychotropic drugs to induce a confession. 49. Cases reviewed by the mission occurred primarily between 2014 and 2018. The torture techniques documented by the mission included stress positions; asphyxiation with plastic bags, chemical substances or water; beatings; electric shocks; death threats; rape threats against either the victim and/or relatives; psychological torture, including sensorial deprivation, constant lighting and extreme cold; and forced nudity. 50. In seven cases investigated, Bolivarian National Intelligence Service agents perpetrated acts of sexual or gender-based violence against detainees in an attempt to elicit confessions or information implicating others, or to degrade, humiliate or punish them. 51. The mission investigated the case of Fernando Albán, who died while in the custody of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service. High-level officials publicly deemed the death of Mr. Albán a suicide, although forensic evidence raises doubts about this conclusion. The examination did not apply the standards required by the Minnesota Protocol on the Investigation of Potentially Unlawful Death (2016) or the Manual on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. His family was unable to undertake an independent autopsy or to bury his corpse, despite numerous requests. 52. The mission’s analysis of accounts from former detainees indicates that from 2014 to 2018 torture was committed in the presence or under the supervision of more senior officials, including the Chief of the Strategic Investigations Directorate and other high-ranking commissioners in the unit. 53. Political detainees spent long periods in pretrial detention with the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service, ranging from months to years, and in one case over four years. In several cases investigated, the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service failed to release detainees despite court orders approving their release while they awaited trial. 54. Political detainees were held in one of two buildings of the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service: headquarters (at Plaza Venezuela) or El Helicoide, often with long periods in isolation. Detention conditions in these buildings were inadequate, in some cases rising to the level of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The mission describes these in detail in the full report. (b) Directorate General of Military Counter-intelligence 55. The Directorate General of Military Counter-intelligence has broad powers to conduct, coordinate and execute activities aimed at the discovery, prevention and shutdown of enemy activity. 8 It is also tasked with preventing subversive activities against the Bolivarian National Armed Forces and protecting the President. 56. The mission investigated 77 cases in which the Directorate General of Military Counter-intelligence arrested, detained and tortured current and former military officials and civilians associated with them. Of these, eight are detailed as case studies in the full report. Arrests of military personnel and associated civilians increased in 2017 as the number of operations against the Government grew more frequent. 57. The mission has also reviewed information received from Foro Penal about 339 arrests of military personnel and associated civilians. Of these, 187 continue to be detained, two 8 Art. 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1,605, 10 February 2015. 7