A/HRC/4/80 page 12 and justice for all Sudanese and not just redress of more narrow tribal interests. The rebel forces began attacking Government police and military targets in late 2002, and those attacks accelerated in 2003. B. Nature of the Government’s response 28. The Government was not prepared either for the intensity or the successes of the rebel attacks. With many of its forces engaged in its long war with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in South Sudan, Khartoum was also concerned because many rank-and-file soldiers in the Sudanese military were from Darfur. The Government significantly picked up its recruitment of proxy militias, continuing to exploit the existing and ongoing tensions between tribal groups. Those members of Arab tribes recruited to fight in Government-backed counterinsurgency operations became known as “Janjaweed,” which is a term used in Darfur for an armed man on horse or camel. 29. Janjaweed attacks, sometimes in concert with Government land and air forces have been and continue to be primarily directed against the civilian population of Darfur, and focused especially on the tribal groups from which most of the rebels have been drawn. In both refugee camps, and in our discussions with a number of observers, we were told of such joint attacks on civilians. Women, children and men have been killed indiscriminately. Villages have been razed, livestock stolen or killed, and crops destroyed, and whole populations forcefully displaced, in part in an attempt to deprive rebel groups of support and resources. In particular, rape and sexual assault have been widespread and systematic, terrorizing women and breaking down families and communities.7 III. THE DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT, THE ENSUING VIOLENCE AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 30. Attempts to resolve the conflict began in 2003, and a ceasefire between the Government and the SLM/A was signed on 3 September of that year. A report to the AU Peace and Security Council read: “Following the September Ceasefire Agreement, fighting largely stopped between the Government and the SLM/A. However violence intensified against the civilian population. A militia group called ‘DJanjaweed’ deliberately targeted civilians viewed as providing support to the SLM/A and the JEM.”8 7 See, inter alia, report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur of February 2005 (S/2005/60); report of the Independent expert on the human rights situation in the Sudan (E/CN.4/2005/11); report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situations in the Sudan (E/CN.4/2006/111); reports of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1591 (2005) (S/2006/65; S/2006/795) and High Commissioner's Periodic Reports on the human rights situation in the Sudan. 8 Fifth Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, Addis Ababa, 13 April 2004, “Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in the Sudan (Crisis in Darfur),” PSC/PR/2(V), p. 2.