A/HRC/4/80 page 18 50. The most elaborate attempt by the Government of the Sudan to create an accountability mechanism with conventional judicial elements was the establishment of the Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur (SCCED). Created by a decree of the Chief Justice, the Court was initially constituted as a panel of three judges, based in El Fasher but with ability to circuit to any location deemed appropriate. It was granted wide jurisdiction covering all crimes in the Sudanese Penal Code and any charges concerning investigations into the violations cited in the report of the Commission of Inquiry and any charges pursuant to any other law, as determined by the Chief Justice. On 26 November 2005, the Chief Justice established two additional Special Criminal Courts for Nyala and El Geneina with the same jurisdiction as the initial SCCED, but with the addition of international humanitarian law (IHL). The SCCED statutes also contained explicit provisions on the right of observers from the AU or other entities to attend the court hearings. 51. The effectiveness of this court has been limited at best. According to observers, only nine known cases have come before the Court.24 The court delivered a verdict in eight of them. A ninth case was initially heard but later dismissed. Only one of these cases dealt with the types of major violations of human rights and the laws of war that have characterized the conflict in Darfur -- an October 2005 attack on Tama in South Darfur.25 No one was found guilty of taking part or held responsible for orchestrating the attack. The men charged in relation to the attack were found guilty only of stealing property at the site of the attack after it took place. According to informed observers, the SCCED has also not addressed the issue of criminal responsibility for senior-level officials in Darfur and Sudan. Only one high-ranking official was ever charged and he was acquitted. Ten State officials, all low-level officers, have been convicted by the SCCED. C. The militias 52. Witnesses, victims and observers we met repeatedly confirmed joint action between Government forces and armed militia in assaulting civilian targets in Darfur. The DPA requires that the Government implement a plan for the neutralization and disarmament of the Janjaweed and other militia. A phased plan to these ends is supposed to be implemented under AU supervision. This requirement, to date, remains largely unimplemented. 53. Arms continue to flow freely, and heavily armed militia continue to operate across the territory of Darfur with impunity.26 Victims and witnesses with whom the Mission met frequently identified the provision of arms by the Government to the Janjaweed and other militias as one of the most significant factors in fostering tensions and violence between tribal groups and communities. 24 Four in Nyala, three in El Fasher and two in El Geneina. 25 Such as the mass killings of civilians, widespread burning of villages, systematic rape, and the other crimes documented by the International Commission of Inquiry. 26 The DPA, including its disarmament provisions, is monitored by UNMIS, which reports monthly on these matters in The DPA Monitor, available at www.unmis.org.