A/HRC/34/64 Photographs of remnants shared by the witness reveal a Russian ShOAB-0.5 bomblet from an RBK-500 series cluster bomb carrying 565 sub-munitions. 59. Syrian and/or Russian forces also used cluster incendiary munitions in eastern Aleppo. While the Syrian Arab Republic has not ratified the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects or the Protocol III thereto prohibiting the use of incendiary weapons, the use of such weapons in a civilian populated area constitutes the war crime of indiscriminate attacks, and means and methods of warfare which cause incidental loss of life (ibid., para. 45). In addition to international humanitarian law obligations, the Russian Federation has been a party to the Convention since 1982, when it was ratified by the Soviet Union. 60. A resident of al-Mashhad neighbourhood described how, on 25 September, three munitions were released from an aircraft over the street where he lived. Upon release, the first munition spread “metal balls” over a 200-metre area. This testimony was consistent with photographs of remnants provided by the witness, which were identified as belonging to a ShOAB-0.5 submunition delivered by an RBK-500 containing 565 bomblets. Another photograph from the attack reveals the remnant of a Soviet ZAB-2.5SM incendiary submunition. D. Attacks behind the frontline 61. During the period under review, residents throughout eastern Aleppo city recalled the abuses they witnessed living under the control of armed groups, including Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki, Jaish al-Mujahedeen, Aljabha al-Shamiya, Failaq al-Sham, Ahrar as-Sham, Fastaqim Kama Umirt Union and Sultan Murad Brigade, among other factions. The full force of their strength comprised between 6,000 and 8,000 fighters. The presence of terrorist group fighters from Jabhat Fatah al-Sham consisted of between 150 and 200 militants, although their influence manifested much more effectively owing to their operational capacity coupled with the fear that they engendered from other groups. Allegations included favouritism concerning the distribution of humanitarian aid, a nepotistic approach to dispute resolution, the denial of freedom of movement, the use of human shields, the use of civilian buildings for military purposes and the overall, general and constant fear of reprisal by armed groups. 62. There does not appear to have been any single chain of command between the various armed groups operating in eastern Aleppo city during the imposition of siege. While armed factions established an operations room, known as “Fatah Halab”, in April 2015, it was scarcely operational. Coordination among armed groups diminished, morale weakened and infighting grew as they steadily lost ground to government forces. By 1 December, just prior to the recapture of eastern Aleppo by pro-Government forces, remaining armed groups in the south-eastern Aleppo pocket announced a new merger, with Jaysh Halab replacing Fatah Halab. The merger was, however, short-lived as armed groups ceded eastern Aleppo city after five months of attrition on 13 December. 63. Shortly after the siege was laid, some armed groups began to confiscate and hide food items that had previously been available throughout most districts. While many civilians, including those sympathetic to armed groups, were aware that they were stockpiling food, most felt powerless to confront them. Residents recounted a surge in prices for items still available for purchase in shops. Some armed groups distributed food and aid preferentially to those within their ranks, their family members and confidants over civilians. For the remaining population, minimal food assistance was occasionally circulated. Some residents believed that, by mid-September, armed groups had rejected the 13