A/HRC/42/CRP.5 intentions of individuals. Under international criminal law the individual, not the State, bears responsibility and must be held to account for the individual’s actions. 222. To conclude that a State is responsible for genocide it is sufficient to demonstrate that genocide is attributable to a State organ, such as a ministry or security force, without identifying specific individuals who are responsible for the genocide. 490 The Tatmadaw is the most notable State organ that engaged in genocidal acts but it is not the only one.491 The Genocide Convention does not require the entirety of the Myanmar State to be involved in genocide to make a finding of genocide under the rules of State responsibility. However, in the case of the “clearance operations” against the Rohingya beginning on 25 August 2017, the vastness of the State’s involvement is inescapable.492 The Tatmadaw and the other security forces acted in a planned and organized fashion under a unified chain of command.493 Military vehicles, such as navy vessels494 and helicopters,495 were reportedly used in the military operations. Soldiers and BGP prepared and launched attacks from government security bases496 and security forces tortured people in government detention facilities.497 There are strong indications that the State provided its resources and gave directions to members of non-Rohingya ethnic groups and informal armed groups who acted alongside, complementary to, and usually in tandem with, the Tatmadaw and other security forces during attacks.498 Local government officials, notably ethnic Rakhine administrators or former administrators, were seen at the sites of many of the attacks, including many of the most serious attacks with heavy loss of life. 499 Prior to the attacks, government officials relied on discriminatory laws and policies as tools to justify their forthcoming genocidal attacks.500 After the attacks, the State adopted and implemented plans and policies that effectively endorsed everything that preceded it, by denying wrongdoing, destroying evidence, refusing to conduct effective investigations and clearing, razing, confiscating and building on land from which it displaced Rohingya,501 while ensuring that the Rohingya who they forced out of Myanmar would not be able to return. 502 In sum, State involvement through military and civilian acts, omissions, organs and persons was extensive. 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 A finding of genocide should not be precluded, for example, where it is clear that a State organ carried out prohibited acts with genocidal intent, but where the author of a genocidal plan or the perpetrators of genocidal acts are not yet identified. Article 4 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts makes it clear that the Tatmadaw is a “state organ” whose actions are attributable to the State: “(1) The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial unit of the State. (2) An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the State.” Article 4 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries (2001). The draft articles are generally accepted as authoritative interpretations of international law, including by the International Court of Justice, and also as generally reflecting customary international law. See, generally, Đorđeska, Marija. “The Process of International Law—Making: The Relationship between the International Court of Justice and the International Law Commission,” International and Comparative Law Review, 2015, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 7–57. A/HRC/39/CRP.2, paras. 1532-1534. A/HRC/39/CRP.2, paras. 1429-1421 and 1526-1527. A/HRC/39/CRP.2, para. 1156. A/HRC/39/CRP.2, paras. 762 and 1084. A/HRC/39/CRP.2, para. 1154 and 1249. A/HRC/39/CRP.2, paras. 929, 1162 and 1172. A/HRC/39/CRP.2, paras. 1258-1271. A/HRC/39/CRP.2, para. 1264. See A/HRC/39/CRP.2, paras. 458-498. A/HRC/39/CRP.2, paras. 1573-1622; See Chapter IV, section B of this report: The situation of the Rohingya; Land clearance, destruction, confiscation and construction. See Chapter IV, section B of this report: The situation of the Rohingya; Conclusions and findings, the impossibility of return. 71