A/HRC/42/CRP.5 My wife and I were in our bunker, our faces were in the dirt. We could barely even breathe. The shooting went on for what felt like hours, then stopped and started again. We thought we would die I was so afraid during the attack. Bullets were raining down.687 300. The gunfire lasted until morning. But when, villagers tried to assess the extent of the casualties and damage, Tatmadaw soldiers started shooting again towards the village, inhibiting relatives from assisting the injured or recovering the bodies of those killed. 688 301. The attack killed five villagers. Four individuals, all relatives, were found dead in one bunker.689 The fifth person, an elderly woman, was found inside her house. 690 Many others sustained injuries, including wounds from bullets and shrapnel. 691 Houses and farmlands were damaged by shelling.692 302. A statement issued by the Office of the Commander-in-Chief on 22 March 2019 accused the AA of using a civilian settlement as cover 693 and said that, in executing its defence strategy, “inevitable loss and injuries may happen”.694 303. Villagers denied the presence of, or any attack launched by, the AA from the village at the time of the attack by the Tatmadaw. The Mission did not receive any indications that the monastery from which the Tatmadaw launched its attack sustained damage or that soldiers stationed in the monastery were injured or killed.695 This implies that there was no AA attack on the military. 304. The Mission also obtained information that civilian casualties may have been avoided, or at least minimized, if villagers had been given advanced warning of the attack. People said that the Tatmadaw did not give any warning despite being stationed inside the village throughout the day.696 A man from the village recalled that, when soldiers were in the village in the afternoon: There was no kind of warning that the people should leave. If we would have received a warning that an attack was coming, we would have fled, and then maybe no one would have died.697 Conclusions and legal findings 305. The Mission was unable to determine what triggered the Tatmadaw’s attack on Sin Taung on 21-22 March 2019. However, the Tatmadaw did not appear to aim its fire, which came from the monastery and from the direction of Buthidaung Town, at specific persons or objects. There are also strong indications that the Tatmadaw knew the AA was not 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 LI-210. LI-213. LI-210, LI-211, LI-212. LI-213, Amnesty International, No one Can Protect Us: War Crimes and Abuses in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, (May 2019), p.16, The Irrawaddy, “5 Civilians Killed as Tatmadaw Troops Open Fire on Village in N. Rakhine: Witnesses” (22 March 2019). LI-210, LI-211, Amnesty International, No one Can Protect Us: War Crimes and Abuses in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, (May 2019), p. 18. Amnesty International, No one Can Protect Us: War Crimes and Abuses in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, (May 2019), p. 18. LI-210, LI-212. The Office of the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services, "AA violent insurgent group attacked the Tatmadaw Column carrying out stability of the region and security tasks, with heavy and small weapons" (22 March 2019): http://cincds.gov.mm/node/2199 The Office of the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services, “AA insurgents lie in wait for Tatmadaw columns near Yaykhaungchaung Village, three bodies of enemy seized” (23 March 2019), available at: http://cincds.gov.mm/node/2232. LI-213, LI-214. LI-210, LI-213, LI-214. For a discussion on the legal requirements of providing advanced warnings of attacks, see Chapter V, section B.1 in this report: The situation in northern Myanmar; Violations by Tatmadaw and Tatmadaw sponsored militia; Tatmadaw attacks and other military operations causing deaths and injury to civilians. LI-210. 93