A/HRC/15/25 36. As stated in its previous report to the HRC (see A/HRC/10/14/Add.2), the Working Group assessed the existence of a regulatory gap covering the activities of PMSCs at the international level. While a number of rules under international humanitarian law and human rights law could apply to States in their relations with PMSCs, the Working Group observed that there have been difficulties in the application of domestic laws, in particular for international PMSCs operating in a foreign State, as well as difficulties in conducting investigations in conflict zones. The effect of this situation is that PMSCs are rarely held accountable for violations of human rights. Although there have been efforts to address this glaring gap over the years, accountability of private military and security contractors continues to be a challenge, with a startling lack of prosecutions. 37. The second argument in favour of an international legal instrument is linked to the very nature of the PMSC industry and its impact on the enjoyment of human rights. The Working Group believes that services provided by PMSCs should not be considered ordinary commercial commodities that can be regulated through self-regulation initiatives. The services provided by PMSCs are highly specific and dangerous and involve trade in a wide variety of military and security services, which call for the development of international standards and oversight mechanisms. 38. The third reason relates to the fact that PMSC personnel cannot usually be considered to be mercenaries, according to the definition of mercenaries as set out in article 47 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts and in article 1 of the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries of 4 December 1989. The definition of mercenaries as used in those two conventions does not generally apply to the personnel of PMSCs legally operating in foreign countries. 39. The aim of a new binding legal instrument is not the outright banning of PMSCs but to establish minimum international standards for States parties to regulate the activities of PMSCs and their personnel. In addition, the Working Group, concerned about the extensive outsourcing of military and security functions and the growing role of PMSCs in armed conflicts, post-conflict and low-intensity armed conflict situations recommends prohibiting the outsourcing of inherently State functions to PMSCs in accordance with the principle of the State monopoly on the legitimate use of force. These functions are detailed later in the report. 40. The proposed convention would reaffirm the responsibilities of States regarding the activities of PMSCs. States are responsible for implementing their obligations under international human rights law, including by adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to give effect to these obligations. To this end they have the obligation to take appropriate measures to prevent, investigate, punish and provide effective remedies for misconduct by PMSCs and their personnel. These legal responsibilities of States, which remain even if States choose to contract out certain activities, have been emphasized by the Human Rights Committee. The Committee stated that “the contracting out to the private commercial sector of core State activities which involve the use of force and the detention of persons does not absolve a State party of its obligations under the Covenant”.7 41. Finally, the proposed new legally binding instrument is aimed at ensuring that States take the necessary measures to promote transparency, responsibility and accountability in their use of PMSCs and their personnel, and establish mechanisms for the rehabilitation of victims. 7 10 A/58/40 (Vol. II) of 1 November 2003, communication No. 1020/2002, Cabal and Pasini vs. Australia, para. 7.2, pp. 357. GE.10-15155