A/HRC/23/22 phenomenon of conscientious objection. It is precisely in time of armed conflict, when the community interests in question are most likely to be under greatest threat, that the right to conscientious objection is most in need of protection, most likely to be invoked and most likely to fail to be respected in practice. In a separate individual opinion of Committee member Mr. Gerald L. Neuman, jointly with members Mr. Yuji Iwasawa, Mr. Michael O’Flaherty and Mr. Walter Kälin (concurring), it was argued that the finding of a violation should have been based on the reasoning of the Yoon case, which treated conscientious objection to military service as a manifestation of religion or belief and that the Committee should consider whether the State had “identified any empirical reasons why its refusal to accommodate conscientious objection to military service would be necessary for one of the legitimate purposes listed in the Covenant”, namely “to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others” (art. 18, para. 3). 11. Given that article 4 of the Covenant does not permit any derogation of a State party’s obligations under article 18 of the Covenant in a time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation, it would appear that there could be no circumstances where the right to conscientious objection to military service could be set aside given the Committee’s jurisprudence that conscientious objection “inheres in the right of thought, conscience and religion”. This would be consistent with the Committee’s position in its concluding observations on a State party report, where the Committee stated that the “State party should fully acknowledge the right to conscientious objection and, accordingly, guarantee it both in wartime and in peacetime”. 7 12. The Committee has made it clear that the right to conscientious objection applies not only to members of religious faiths that have pacifist tenets such as, for example, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Quakers, and Mennonites, but rather to “all religious beliefs and other convictions”.8 In its general comment No. 22, the Committee has interpreted the terms “religion” and “belief” broadly, stating that “article 18 protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs … Article 18 is not limited in its application to traditional religions or to religions and beliefs with institutional characteristics or practices analogous to those of traditional religions” (para. 2). Therefore, a State, for example, would be in violation of article 18 of the Covenant if it only recognized the right to conscientious objection to persons who had an affiliation with an approved list of religious faiths that were found to be pacifist in character.9 In its concluding observations, the Committee called on one reporting State to “extend the right of conscientious objection against mandatory military service to persons who hold non-religious beliefs grounded in conscience, as well as beliefs grounded in all religions”.10 13. A claim of conscientious objection to military service must be based on an objection to the obligation to use lethal force. This position is reflected in the Committee’s general comment No. 22, paragraph 11, and in the Committee’s jurisprudence in Westerman v. the Netherlands.11 7 8 9 10 11 Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Finland, CCPR/CO/82/FIN, para. 14. Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Ukraine, CCPR/CO/73/UKR, para. 20; see also concluding observations on the initial report of Kyrgyzstan, CCPR/CO/69/KGZ, para. 18. Ibid. Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Ukraine, CCPR/C/UKR/CO/6. Communication No. 682/1996, decision of admissibility, 16 October 1997. 5