A/HRC/39/54 population against the effects of military operations in an armed conflict, but there is no reason why those safeguards should not apply to economic sanctions imposed in the course of or outside an armed conflict — even, it has been argued, those decided by the Security Council.22 Irrespective of whether the measures considered are applied in peacetime or in connexion with military operations, de facto blockades imposed as a result of measures aiming at the economic isolation of the target country, through restrictions or prohibitions on imports and exports abroad and transfers of goods between the target and the rest of the world, also entail some form of collective punishment. It has been argued in that respect that “economic sanctions … whether applied by the United Nations under Chapter VII of the Charter or unilaterally, must be designed with regard to the techniques selected, with as much attention to context and capacity for discrimination as must a lawful sanctions programme using the military instrument”.23 27. In that context, there appears to be no valid reason why peacetime measures having basically the same effects as blockades could be considered as lawfully inducing situations of starvation or collective punishment (in addition to adversely affecting a range of basic human rights), where such situations would have been deemed unacceptable in military conflict under the rules of international humanitarian law. 28. In the context of a proliferation of sanctions, the Special Rapporteur considers it necessary to renew his proposal to establish a consolidated central register at the level of the Secretariat to recapitulate the list of all unilateral sanctions in force. 24 The absence of a central United Nations register and the correlative impossibility of obtaining and collecting exhaustive data on sanctions regimes applied worldwide, their characteristics, their scope, targets and consequences, and possible interference with Security Council sanctions, hamper the coherence of international action. as well as public awareness and accurate understanding of the phenomenon of unilateral coercive measures and of their adverse consequences for the enjoyment of human rights. 29. When sanctions, especially those purporting to have extraterritorial effect, are used as a routine foreign policy tool against each and every State, Government or entity that the most prolific sanctions user unilaterally determines, on the basis of questionable “evidence” or mere suspicions or allegations that a corrupt regime engaged in malign activities is attempting to subvert Western democracies, the very architecture of the international system based on the Charter of the United Nations and the International Bill of Human Rights is at risk. It will be increasingly difficult to maintain an international order allowing for international cooperation and understanding, effective respect for and promotion of human rights, or even mere coexistence among States, if sanctions and embargoes grounded in the rhetoric of confrontation become commonplace tools and take precedence over normal diplomatic intercourse. It may be worth recalling that Article 2 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations states that the Organization is “based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members” and that Article 1 (2) sets out as one of the purposes of the United Nations to “develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace”. Also, at a time when threats of the use of coercion or even armed force are voiced, either in a veiled form or openly, in public addresses or in casual Twitter messages, the continued relevance of Article 2 (4) of the Charter, which states that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 22 23 24 See Hans-Peter Gasser, “Collective economic sanctions and international humanitarian law. An enforcement measure under the United Nations Charter and the right of civilians to immunity: an unavoidable clash of policy goals?”, Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (ZaöRV), vol. 56. See Reisman and Stevick, “The applicability of international law standards to United Nations economic sanctions programmes”. Draft elements of a United Nations register of unilateral sanctions likely to have a human rights impact were appended to the previous report of the Special Rapporteur (A/HRC/36/44, annex, appendix I), as a possible basis for multilateral negotiations aimed at the establishment of such a register. 9