A/HRC/13/33 implement it appropriately should be considered as guilty of misleading advertising, and public authorities therefore have a duty to monitor such compliance.30 24. The main concern raised by codes of conduct is that they would de facto appear as substitutes for negotiation and bargaining, and divert companies from signing international framework agreements (IFAs), or from joining multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs). 2. International framework agreements 25. Some 72 international framework agreements (IFAs) have been concluded to date between transnational corporations and global unions. Among them are agreements concerning the food sector, such as the agreement concluded between Danone and IUF in 1988, between Accor and IUF in 1995, Carrefour and UNI in 2001, Chiquita and IUF/COLSIBA in 2001, and Fonterra and IUF in 2002. These IFAs go beyond most codes of conduct because of the active implication of the unions in monitoring the undertakings of the company which signed the agreement. Their main purpose is to protect the ability of local unions to bargain effectively over working conditions, including wages. They may thus strengthen the ability of unions throughout the group to protect workers, and they limit the competition between workers of the same group. 26. A number of conditions should be fulfilled in order for IFAs to be truly effective.31 First, they should protect the basic rights of workers throughout the whole supply chain, covering not only the direct employees of the transnational corporation, but also those of its suppliers, contract growers or joint venture partners, wherever they operate. Second, appropriate information should be given to workers about the content of the IFA, so that they may complain in case of violation. Third, they should go beyond guaranteeing the ability of unions to bargain collectively at local level and include, at a minimum, a provision on a living wage, if necessary higher than that set under the applicable minimum wage legislation. This would be consistent with the obligation of companies to respect the right to food in their operations. Fourth, where one supplier does not comply with the requirement of the IFA, the buyer should not be obliged either to do nothing or to cut off relationships with that supplier; here also, a range of graduated options should be available, and the buyer should commit to supporting the supplier in its efforts to comply with the content of the IFA. These different conditions could be taken into account by employers’ organizations in the food sector and the IUF in the preparation of a model IFA. D. Remedies 27. Just as legal guarantees of a living wage and compliance with other labour rights require the strengthening of enforcement mechanisms, particularly through labour inspectorates, codes of conduct or IFAs are only as valuable as the monitoring mechanisms they include. States should therefore be encouraged to allow consumers to challenge the compliance of companies with the codes of conduct they advertise, and global unions negotiating IFAs should ensure that monitoring will be effective. 30 31 10 Kasky v. Nike, 27 Cal. 4th 939 (2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 817, and cert. dismissed, 123 S. Ct. 2254 (2003); in the EU, see art. 6 (2) (b) of Directive 2005/29/EC of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market (“Unfair Commercial Practices Directive”), OJ L 149, 11.6.2005, p. 22. See also Lone Riisgaard, The IUF/COLSIBA – CHIQUITA framework agreement: a case study, ILO working paper No. 94, 2004. GE.09-17776