A/HRC/30/21 death penalty went hand-in-hand with respect of the sovereignty of States. In that regard, they called on States that continued to use the death penalty to acknowledge their own constitutional provisions on human rights, including the rights to life and human dignity, and asserted that such constitutional commitments must inform discussions on the death penalty. They also pointed out that, while the death penalty might be a sentence permissible under some domestic laws, the practice must be scrutinized in the light of national human rights commitments as well as obligations under international and regional human rights treaties. 26. Some participants stated that the death penalty was a matter of criminal justice, rather than human rights; and that it underpinned their criminal justice systems in order to guarantee peace, security, and human rights for their citizens. Rejecting that argument, several delegates and experts highlighted the fact that human rights were increasingly perceived as universal, and therefore belonged to all humanity. The criminal justice system of a country should be based on human rights, and it should respect the country’s obligations under international human rights law. They found the arguments opposing criminal justice and human rights unconvincing, as ultimately the two complemented each other. 27. Several delegates acknowledged the significant progress achieved so far through the adoption of five resolutions on a moratorium on the use of the death penalty (General Assembly resolutions 62/149 of 2007, 63/168 of 2008, 65/206 of 2010, 67/176 of 2012, 69/186 of 2014) the latest of which was adopted in December 2014 by a record number of 117 votes in favour, with 95 co-sponsors. It called upon all States, inter alia, to establish a moratorium on executions with a view to abolishing the death penalty. Experts cautioned, however, against the risks attached to moratoriums. At times, the fact that a moratorium was in place encouraged judges to issue death sentences more easily, under the assumption that the condemned would not be executed anyway. It was, therefore, desirable to abolish the death penalty in all circumstances. C. Rights of victims of crimes and the myth of deterrence 28. Some delegates mentioned the rights of victims of crimes to justify the retention of the death penalty. They found it unacceptable to call for the protection of the rights of offenders involved in heinous crimes, while ignoring the rights of victims of such crimes. In response, several delegates and experts called for States to ensure the voices of those victims in whose name the death penalty was being carried out were heard and made part of the process of moving towards abolition. In that regard, several initiatives that involved victims of crimes and their families in the abolition process were highlighted. Several delegates also emphasized that research from across regions showed that not all victims’ families felt that killing the perpetrators brought closure to them. They did not often want the death penalty, but rather expected to see justice done effectively and efficiently. Statistics from one country from the Americas showed that, despite the mandatory death penalty for murder and some other crimes, only 5 per cent of convictions for murder were recorded in that country. Finally, the move towards abolition might create space for dialogue and improve respect for victims’ rights. 29. Some delegates stated that the death penalty remained an important deterrent against most serious crimes. They stressed that the rights of offenders must always be weighed against the rights of the victims, their families and broader rights of their community to live in peace; and the State had a responsibility to protect the lives of innocent citizens while ensuring that justice was rendered to the victims and their families. Challenging that argument, several delegates and experts referred to an extensive body of research that disproved any suggestion that the death penalty had a deterrent effect on crime. They 8