A/HRC/19/68 Commission saw no physical evidence thereof during its site visits. Witnesses also denied that the sites had had military utility. NATO informed the Commission that “the regime was using civilian rather than military structures in support of military action”. Assuming this to be the case, the Commission remains concerned about the resulting civilian harm. 3. Conclusions 89. The Commission found that NATO did not deliberately target civilians in Libya. For the few targets struck within population centres, NATO took extensive precautions to ensure that civilians were not killed. There was, however, a small number of strikes where the information provided by NATO did not allow the Commission to draw a conclusion on the rationale for or the circumstances of the attacks. The Commission was unable to conclude, barring additional explanation, whether these strikes were consistent with the objective of NATO to avoid civilian casualties entirely, or whether NATO had taken all necessary precautions to that effect. The characterization by NATO of four of five targets where the Commission found civilian casualties as “command and control nodes” or “troop staging areas” was not reflected in evidence at the scene and nor by witness testimony. The Commission was unable to determine, owing to a lack of information, whether these strikes were based on incorrect or outdated intelligence and, therefore, whether they were consistent with the NATO objective of taking all precautions necessary to avoid civilian casualties entirely. I. Prohibited weapons17 90. The Commission examined the use of weapons prohibited by treaty and customary international law. It is aware that not all weapons discussed in the present report are prohibited for all countries involved. Qadhafi forces employed cluster munitions and antipersonnel and anti-vehicle landmines, including in civilian areas. The Commission found considerable evidence of the use of cluster munitions and mines against civilian areas of Misrata in April 2011. It also found evidence of the use of landmines in the Nafusa Mountains. Minefields were not properly recorded by Qadhafi forces. Many of the mines used had a low metal content, complicating detection and removal, further endangering civilians. There was some limited use of landmines by individual members of the thuwar. There was no evidence of the use of chemical weapons, phosphorous or dum-dum bullets by any party to the conflict. J. Mercenaries18 91. The Commission established that an organized group of Sudanese fighters were brought in by the Qadhafi Government specifically to fight the thuwar. It did not find that these fighters were promised or paid material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to local Qadhafi forces, a requirement for these individuals or groups to fall within the definition of a “mercenary” under the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, financing and Training of Mercenaries or under the Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa. The Commission also determined that there were fighters within the Qadhafi forces who, though of foreign descent, were born in Libya or resident there. They would also fall outside the definition of mercenaries. 17 18 See ibid., chap. III, sect. I. See ibid., chap. III, sect. J. 17