A/HRC/23/49 diligence to address violence against women, it was suggested by the first Special Rapporteur in 1999 that the following questions needed to be asked: (a) Has the State party ratified all the international human rights instruments including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women? (b) Is there constitutional authority guaranteeing equality for women or the prohibition of violence against women? (c) Is there national legislation and/or administrative sanctions providing adequate redress for women victims of violence? (d) Are there executive policies or plans of action that attempt to deal with the question of violence against women? (e) Is the criminal justice system sensitive to the issues of violence against women? In this regard, what is police practice? How many cases are investigated by the police? How are victims dealt with by the police? How many cases are prosecuted? What types of judgements are given in such cases? Are the health professionals who assist the prosecution sensitive to issues of violence against women? (f) Do women who are victims of violence have support services such as shelters, legal and psychological counselling, specialized assistance and rehabilitation provided either by the Government or by non-governmental organizations? (g) Have appropriate measures been taken in the field of education and the media to raise awareness of violence against women as a human rights violation and to modify practices that discriminate against women? (h) Are data and statistics being collected in a manner that ensures that the problem of violence against women is not invisible? 14 18. The meaning of State responsibility to act with due diligence was further examined by the second Special Rapporteur on violence against women in a 2006 report (E/CN.4/2006/61, para. 19 ff). One of the primary problems she found was that the due diligence standard focused primarily on violence against women as an isolated act and failed to take into consideration the connections between violence and the violation of other human rights, including general principles of gender equality and non-discrimination. She also addressed the need to move away from a public/private dichotomy in viewing violence against women. Her argument is that categorizing some forms of violence against women as part of the private sphere tends to have a normalizing effect, and it makes States’ intervention seem to be different in such situations, as opposed to where there are “public” incidents of violence. 19. The previous mandate holder argued that principles of non-discrimination require States “to use the same level of commitment in relation to prevention, investigation, punishment and provision of remedies for violence against women as they do with regards to other forms of violence” (ibid., para. 35). She noted that due diligence had until then “tended to be limited to responding to violence against women when it occurs and in this context it has concentrated on legislative reform, access to justice and the provision of services. There has been relatively little work done on the more general obligation of prevention, including the duty to transform patriarchal gender structures and values that perpetuate and entrench violence against women” (ibid., para. 15). 14 6 E/CN.4/1999/68, para. 25.