A/HRC/43/45 G. Migration-related debt 71. Migration-related debt may be taken on to pay for the costs of migrating to another country, with or without documents. It can include payment of documentation, travel by various means, assistance in crossing borders, or even bribing authorities during transit or paying for smugglers when migrating without documentation. Such debt is frequently an issue for the entire (extended) family, and creates generational links and obligations across elders and younger members. 72. Although migration from Central and South America to the United States is a welldocumented reality, increasing border controls and cruel practices, including detention of non-accompanied children, witnessed in recent years have focused the spotlight on its complexities and the financial network underpinning it. It is obvious that more stringent migration policies will lead to higher prices (and debt) for migrants to pay those who provide support to travel. 73. The more debt a family member incurs for economic migration, the more likely a never-ending debt-driven cycle, fed by the hope of avoiding the loss of collateral. Psychological and physical pressure, sexual harassment, death threats and other means of intimidating relatives who stay behind are frequently a feature of the abuse exercised by collectors and smugglers. The pressure applied may even lead to suicide. Since parcels of land that are essential for livelihood of the family or a house are often put up as collateral, victims are not only left over-indebted but also without any of the meagre resources they once had. 74. At each attempt, the dangers and threats increase, and the smuggling networks (including “coyotes” and traffickers), sometimes in collusion with security forces at borders, take financial advantage. Individuals and families therefore go beyond their network to borrow, turning to high-interest loans from unregulated or loosely regulated institutional actors, such as prestamistas (moneylenders), notaries, cooperatives or banks, using land, homes, vehicles, or goods as collateral.88 In such a context, some might consider remigration the only option for debt repayment. 75. The sad irony is that many of those who migrate for economic need are frequently abandoned by their State. At the same time, they send remittances back to their countries of origin and contribute greatly to sustaining the economy. In Guatemala, remittances accounted for more than 11 per cent of GDP and more than foreign investment in the country in 2017.89 76. Even in the case of formal migration, some countries do not allow recent migrants to work for a certain period, which aggravates their economic family situation while having to repay migration-related debts. Furthermore, refugees and asylum seekers can incur new debts when arriving to a country as they face a range of financial challenges to meet their basic needs. For example, in 2018, 88 per cent of Syrian refugee households in Lebanon had debts.90 77. The situation is not much different in South-East Asia, where concern has been growing concern in recent years over migrant overindebtedness. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has identified specific dynamics, including an increasing reliance on debt to finance migration costs; high rates of household debt among migrant sending families; new forms of distress migration induced by overindebtedness; the degree to which remittances and migrant earnings are channelled towards the payment of loans; and the emotional and psychological impact of indebtedness on migrants.91 88 89 90 91 16 Laura Heidbrink, “The coercive power of debt: migration and deportation of Guatemala indigenous youth”, The Journal of Latin America and Caribbean Anthropology, vol. 24, No. 1 (2019). IMF Country Report No. 18/155, June 2018, p. 5. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Yearly UN Study: Syrian Refugees in Lebanon Accumulated More Debt in 2018 than Ever before”, 26 December 2018. IOM, Debt and the Migration Experience: Insights from South-East Asia, 2019, p. 15.