A/HRC/44/38 threatens the life of the nation may … be relevant to a determination of whether a particular act or omission leading to deprivation of life is arbitrary and to a determination of the scope of the positive measures that States parties must undertake.”65 46. A situation such as the killing of General Soleimani demands contextual and situational analysis, the reference to other sources of law and purposive interpretation. The European Court for Human Rights (ECtHR) has introduced flexibility in its assessment of necessity and proportionality on the basis of the context. It recognizes that the standard of absolute necessity may be simply impossible “where the authorities had to act under tremendous time pressure and where their control of the situation was minimal … The Court is acutely conscious of the difficulties faced by States in protecting their populations from terrorist violence, and recognises the complexity of this problem.”66 47. For instance, in Finogenov v. Russia (2011),67 the ECtHR ruled that there had been no violation of the right to life when the Russian state used gas to resolve a hostage crisis in a theatre because the authorities were acting under time pressure and their control of the situation was minimal. It found that the authorities could reasonably have concluded from the circumstances that there existed a real and serious risk for the lives (in this case of the hostages), and that the use of lethal force was sooner or later unavoidable. In another case,68 the Court determined that in order to ascertain whether a State has used reasonable force in relation to the right to life, it must examine the planning of the operation, and its investigation, along with its actual execution. Only with this latter did the Court find that the use of force has not been disproportionate because the soldiers were acting in reaction to a “genuine belief” that it was necessary to shoot the suspects in light of the alternatively grave consequences. 48. The targeted killing of General Soleimani raises however three issues at least, which are difficult if not impossible to reconcile with the aforementioned standards guiding the use of force: (i) the planning inherent to a drone strike indicating premeditation and the absence of considering alternative options (except calling off the strike); (ii) the absence of evidence that the target presented an imminent or even actual threat to life: even when incorporating the secrecy inherent to intelligence work, the information provided by the US authorities are remarkably vague and inconsequential as far as a possible imminent threat is concerned 69; (iii) the killing of 9 other persons in addition to that of General Soleimani, who individually have not been identified and assessed as presenting imminent threats. Five of these were civilians of Iraq, a US partner. 49. The United States report to the Security Council about the strike makes no reference to the General himself, speaking only of leadership elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Public statements in the immediate aftermath of the drone strike, particularly that of President Trump himself, spoke of Soleimani plotting imminent and sinister attacks on American diplomats and military personnel “but we caught him in the act and terminated him”.70 50. The Special Rapporteur appreciates the need for careful analysis and consideration in protecting the public against threats. However, striking well before an attack is imminent – on the grounds that this is the best shot – makes the actual existence of the threat difficult to evaluate after the fact and increases the likelihood that alternatives – such as capture and detention – are never really considered. A threat to life is not imminent if it has “not yet crystallized” but “might materialize at some time in the future”. Otherwise, one excludes 65 66 67 68 69 70 32 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36, para 67. https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-108231%22]} para. 211–212. Finogenov v. Russia, 2011 32; 3. http://iusgentium.ufsc.br/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Texto-Cmpl-McCANN-AND-OTHERS-vUK.pdf. https://www.justsecurity.org/68094/how-to-think-about-the-soleimani-strike-in-four-questions/. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-blast-intelligence/trump-says-soleimani-plottedimminent-attacks-but-critics-question-just-how-soon-idUSKBN1Z228N.