A/HRC/44/38 28. Fourthly, if the strike against General Soleimani was itself a “first strike” triggering an IAC - against whom was that international armed conflict initiated: Iran? Iraq? Both? Applying a “first strike” theory would mean that the car carrying General Soleimani and his companions would be considered a conflict zone, but that everywhere else in the immediate surrounds of the convoy – as far as the Iraqi government and people were aware – was a nonconflict zone. It is understood that IHL may be applied to an act rather than spatially. Nevertheless, when the “first strike” theory is operationalized, its result may be the existence of an IAC limited to the vehicle in which General Soleimani was travelling and inevitably the asphalt within its immediate proximity. But as limited as these are spatially, they nevertheless are located on Iraq’s sovereign territory. 29. Fifthly, the Special Rapporteur notes that there may be valid reasons to assert that the US strike against General Soleimani did trigger an IAC and thus should be bound by IHL. 30. The strike was against a high-level State official, making it qualitatively different from the other drone strikes analysed by Special Rapporteurs, which were launched against nonState actors. This is the primary reason the Soleimani strike is considered a watershed change in the conduct of extraterritorially targeted strikes and killings. It is hard to imagine that a similar strike against a Western military leader would not be considered as an act of war, potentially leading to intense action, political, military and otherwise, against the State launching the strike. Indeed, this seems precisely the type of strike that the “first shot” doctrine is designed to capture if one is to follow the doctrine. However, the reactions amongst governments in the aftermath of the strike provide evidence of the fear of a fullblown conflict between the two countries, and possibly further beyond. 31. The determination that the strike prompted an IAC would imply that the parties are bound by their obligations under the Geneva Convention. According to the Geneva Academy, the conclusion that the shooting down of a military drone triggers an IAC is “the only way to fulfil the goals of IHL … Even if the armed forces of one state attack one military target in the territory of another state, it is crucial to apply this principle in order to protect civilians in that territory40.” Under this approach, the strike against Soleimani, in continuing or triggering an IAC, imposed obligations upon the striking State to protect civilians, among other requirements. It is unclear whether the US intended to abide by IHL when striking General Soleimani, although one hopes that they sought to do so. Indeed, humanitarian law principles of distinction and proportionality are reflected in the 2016 Report on the legal and policy frameworks guiding the United States’ use of military force and the 2019 Presidential Policy Guidance. 41 In contrast however, the US has continuously insisted that its human rights obligations do not apply extraterritorially, thereby potentially leaving a black hole with no legal standards, should IHL not apply.42 32. Yet, while it may be principled and somehow pragmatic, in order to protect Iraqi civilians, to conclude that the Soleimani strike constituted an IAC, it presents several limitations. 33. The identity of States involved in specific incidents, their relations, and the domestic legal frameworks within which they operate, ought to be considered when conducting a technical assessment of the determination of an international or non-international armed conflict, but these factors cannot solely be determining 43. Such an approach in particular ignores the complementary of IHL and IHRL in armed conflict situations, confirmed by 40 41 42 43 Geneva Academy, December 2019, p.5. U.S. Report on the legal and policy frameworks guiding the United States’ use of military force and related national security operations, p. 25. https://www.justsecurity.org/68030/targeted-killing-of-general-soleimani-why-the-laws-of-warshould-apply-and-why-it-matters/ Eliav Lieblich argues state practice regarding extra-territorial application of human rights would lead to the possible outcome, that neither IHL nor IHRL would apply. https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/irrc-873-vite.pdf. 29