A/HRC/44/38 international armed conflict. Four scenarios relating to targeted killings using drones may be identified: (a) The first scenario involves a drone strike in neither an international or noninternational armed conflict. Such a strike must be assessed under international human rights law, taking into account the larger context, whether derogations have been activated (as highlighted in relevant jurisprudence)85 and the specifics of the situation; (b) Under the second scenario, the drone strike occurs in an international or noninternational armed conflict in the midst of, or alongside, active and open hostilities involving exchange of fire, conventional air strikes and other military operations; (c) Under the third scenario, although a country or region may be affected by an international or non-international armed conflict, the drone strikes far away from any battlefield, striking instead in areas where, or at a time when, there is no military activity, presence, control or engagement. This is a pertinent scenario:86 many contemporary conflicts involve sporadic, unpredictable front lines that often leave large areas of a country or region entirely or almost free of exposure to active or ongoing exchange of enemy fire; (d) Under the fourth scenario, the drone strike is a first strike that potentially triggers an international armed conflict. No other elements or acts constitutive of a conflict exist before, concurrently with or even after the strike. 42. In the first scenario, the applicable body of law is clear. By comparison, the outcomes of an assessment of the lawfulness of targeted killings in the last three scenarios 87 and, in particular the last two, may vary. 43. One approach is to apply the legal regime that is the most protective of victims, 88 or that which privileges individual rights over State rights. 89 In these instances, however, international humanitarian law would always be displaced in favour of international human rights law. 44. Under another approach – the systemic integration approach,90 which is derived from article 31 (3) (c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and has been applied by the International Court of Justice91 – the different rules of international law would be used to assess the situation and/or support a purposive interpretation of Convention-based rights.92 This approach is in keeping with the derogation clauses of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and regional instruments, applicable in the exceptional circumstances of emergency or war.93 It is backed up by contemporary jurisprudence.94 In the aforementioned scenarios, a systemic integration approach would not consider humanitarian 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 12 European Court of Human Rights, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, application No. 61498/08, judgment of 2 March 2010; McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, application No. 18984/91, judgment of 27 September 1995. This is the position defended by the Special Rapporteur in a previous report on armed non-State actors. In the second scenario above, international human rights law continues to apply, but in the Special Rapporteur’s views, as elaborated below, the immediate context and situation demand that the lawfulness of armed drone strikes be assessed for compliance with international humanitarian law principles, particularly those protecting civilians from deliberate or disproportionate attacks. Alonso Gurmendi Dunkelberg, “There and back again: the inter-American human rights system’s approach to international humanitarian law” (8 March 2017); Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Las Palmeras v. Colombia, judgment of 6 December 2001. http://opiniojuris.org/2020/01/13/the-soleimani-case-and-the-last-nail-in-the-lex-specialis-coffin/. www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/18918131.2017.1353213?journalCode=rnhr20. Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 161. Milanović, “The lost origins of lex specialis”. A/HRC/37/52. Derogations must be well calibrated, exceptional and temporary. See, for example, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, 1997; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, judgment of 30 November 2012, pp. 211‒236; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 168, at p. 242, para. 216.