A/HRC/44/38 (c) The justifications have also the effect of weakening the distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Were the blurring of these lines to be allowed, States could support the legality of their acts by cherry-picking justifications from different legal spheres. A clear distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello must be maintained to secure the safeguards of each and their complementary; (d) The application of a “first shot” theory to the targeted killing of a State actor translates into the real possibility that all soldiers, anywhere in the world, could constitute a legitimate target. 62. The full implications of the targeted killing of a State actor using a drone for future conduct are unknown. What is known is that the legal distortions of the past 20 years, coupled with the technological prowess of the “second drone age”, have enabled a substantial increase in the use of force: low-intensity conflicts take place with few if any geographical or temporal boundaries.118 The targeted killing of a State actor in a third State has brought “the signature technique of the so-called ‘war on terror’ into the context of inter-State relations”119 and highlighted the real risks that the expansion of the “war on terror” doctrine 120 poses to international peace.121 63. The international community must now confront the very real prospect that States may opt strategically to eliminate high-ranking military officials in the absence of an obvious war and seek to justify such killings on the grounds that the target was a “terrorist” who posed a potential future threat. 64. In other words, the targeted killing of General Soleimani, coming in the wake of 20 years of distortions of international law and repeated massive violations of humanitarian law,122 is not just a slippery slope. It is a cliff.123 IV. International scrutiny and oversight 65. Notwithstanding the legal gymnastics that a number of States must perform as they attempt to justify targeted killings using drones, many such killings qualify either as arbitrary under article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or as violations of jus ad bellum. Some killings, along with their so-called “collateral” casualties, may also violate international humanitarian law. However, the lack of investigations into these incidents keeps them sealed off from truth and accountability. 66. At the international level, where should these matters be reviewed, in a consequential way and in a manner that encourages States to take the outcomes of such reviews seriously? Unfortunately, to date, international oversight mechanisms have not been able to address this situation with the gravity it deserves. In an extensive 2017 study, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, for example, found that there was a pressing need to address the lack of transparency, oversight and accountability for the use of armed drones. 124 67. Given that finding and keeping in mind the importance of Article 51 of the Charter for global peace and security, the principal mission of the United Nations, it seems reasonable to suggest that States who invoke Article 51 to justify targeted killings by drones or other tools owe the international community a thorough justification, not a cursory report. Such 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 16 Christof Heyns and others, “The international law framework regulating the use of armed drones”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 65, No. 4 (October 2016), pp. 791–827. www.justsecurity.org/67937/soleimani-strike-marks-a-novel-shift-in-targeted-killing-dangerous-tothe-global-order/. See, for example, A/73/361. The use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State may constitute an act of aggression. As of 2018, the International Criminal Court has had jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. See, for example, www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/ NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=25520&LangID=E; A/HRC/43/57. To paraphrase Marko Milanović (interview, March 2020). www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/increasing-transparency-oversight-and-accountability-ofarmed-unmanned-aerial-vehicles-en-692.pdf.