A/HRC/44/38 I. Introduction 1. Armed drones, whether deployed by State or non-State actors, can nowadays strike deep into national territory, targeting individuals and public infrastructure. While some “incidents”, such as the drone strike in January 2020 against Iranian Major General Qasem Soleimani (see annex) or that against Saudi Arabian oil facilities, 1 generate strong political reactions, the vast majority of targeted killings by drones 2 are subjected to little public scrutiny, at both the national and international levels. Yet, drone technologies and drone attacks pose fundamental challenges to international legal standards, the prohibition against arbitrary killings, the lawful limitations on permissible use of force and the very institutions established to safeguard peace and security. 2. This is not to suggest that armed drones are mainly, or solely, responsible for a weakening in compliance with applicable international law. Deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian objects such as schools, hospitals and ambulances in Afghanistan, Libya, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, as well as in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, to name but a few places, demonstrate the tragic disregard for the most essential humanitarian principles.3 Yet, while the deliberations of investigative bodies, commissions of inquiry, the General Assembly and the Security Council have led to some condemnation of these breaches of international humanitarian law and the resulting mass violations, by comparison, and despite their significant civilian casualties, the consequences of targeted killings by armed drones have been relatively neglected by States and institutions. 3. A reasonable argument can be made that to single out drones is misguided, given that many targeted killings are carried out by conventional means – e.g., by special operations forces. Indeed, these also raise serious concerns. The present report thus contains findings applicable to all forms of targeted killings, no matter the method employed. Nonetheless, understanding the particularities of armed drone technologies is crucial if we are to keep pace with current and expected developments affecting the right to life. 4. Two previous Special Rapporteurs have focused on the use of drones to carry out targeted killings, setting out the applicable legal obligations under three legal regimes. They lamented the lack of clarity among States about their obligations, the absence of accountability and States’ broad and permissive interpretations of the rules.4 In 2013, the then Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions warned that the expansive use of armed drones by the first States to acquire them, if not challenged, can do structural damage to the cornerstones of international security and set precedents that undermine the protection of life across the globe in the longer term.5 5. Seven years later, the world has entered what has been called the “second drone age”,6 a time in which a vast array of State and non-State actors are deploying ever-more advanced 1 2 3 4 5 6 On 14 September 2019, drones flown alongside cruise missiles hit oil processing facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais in eastern Saudi Arabia, which provide 6 per cent of world oil supply. The Houthi movement in Yemen claimed responsibility. Some States deemed the Islamic Republic of Iran responsible. The drones were possibly UAV-Xs. The United Nations panel that inspected them found they were powered by German and Chinese engines. Targeted killings are the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by States or armed non-State actors, in times of peace and in international and non-international armed conflicts, through drones, sniper fire, shooting at close range, missiles, car bombs, poison etc. Although in most circumstances targeted killings violate the right to life, in the exceptional circumstance of armed conflict they may be legal (A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, paras. 7–10). When the vast majority of war casualties are civilians, it is clear that the principles of distinction, proportionality, necessity and precaution are being disregarded on a large scale. See S/2019/373. It has been estimated that 85 per cent of war casualties are civilians. A/HRC/26/36 and A/68/382 and Corr.1. A/68/382 and Corr.1, para. 16. https://theintercept.com/2019/05/14/turkey-second-drone-age/?comments=1. 3