A/HRC/44/38 actual person or people carrying out the attack, or on the equipment to be used in the attack, an attack on the leader in an attempt to deter further attacks may not be effective as future attacked could still occur without him, although possibly not in the short-term.117 78. Thirdly, there is no evidence that Iraq was unable or unwilling to defend US forces on its territory. This doctrine historically has been used in circumstances where a State is unable to control actors or regions of the country or where it is in some way complicit in allowing the target to operate and plan attacks. Iraq in contrast is a US ally and has been actively cooperating with the US in combatting ISIL; yet the US did not even consult Iraq before this strike. There has been no evidence brought forward by the US as to what steps it had taken to seek Iraq’s involvement and protection before taking the strike. Vague comments about conversations by one US official had with Iraq do not suffice. 118 79. There is an obligation on a State considering conducting a targeted killing on another State’s official on the territory of a third State to also factor into their assessment of necessity and proportionality the third state’s sovereignty, as well as the risks to the population and infrastructure of the third State. The equal sovereignty of States is one of the highest principles of international law and a cornerstone of the UN. So weighty is the test of this obligation that involving a non-consenting state in any act of self-defense may well be always disproportionate119 and thus, always unjustified. 80. What is most telling is the failure of the US to even address the rights of Iraq and explain, and provide evidence for, its use of force against the country and its citizens. Until such an explanation is made, the conclusion must be that the strike is an act of aggression against Iraq, and the killing of its citizens and of non-citizens on its territory was unlawful and arbitrary under international law.120 81. The implication as far as the targeted killing of General Soleimani is concerned is that it was an arbitrary killing for which the US is responsible: “States parties engaged in acts of aggression as defined in international law, resulting in deprivation of life, violate ipso facto article 6 of the Covenant.” 121 This is an approach backed up by almost universal jurisprudence122 and expert comments.123 VII. In conclusion 82. Accordingly, in light of the evidence that the US has provided to date, the targeting of General Soleimani, and the deaths of those accompanying him, constitute an arbitrary killing for which, under IHRL, the US is responsible. The strike was in violation of Art. 2 (4) of the UN Charter with insufficient evidence provided of an ongoing or imminent attack. No evidence has been provided that General Soleimani specifically was planning an imminent attack against US interests, particularly in Iraq, for which immediate action was necessary and would have been justified. No evidence has been provided that a drone strike in a third country was necessary or that the harm caused to that country was proportionate to the harm allegedly averted. While there is information suggesting that the US requested, at least in December 2019, that Iraq take action against Kata’ib Hezbollah, no evidence has been provided that Iraq was consulted on how to alleviate any threats posed to the US arising from the visit of General Soleimani, such that Iraq should bear the burden of addressing those threats. No evidence has been produced that there was no time for the US to seek aid from 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 Ibid. https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2049227/statement-by-secretary-ofdefense-dr-mark-t-esper-as-prepared/. Akande and Liefländer, Clarifying Necessity, Imminence, and Proportionality in the Law of SelfDefense, 107 The American Journal of International Law 563, 568 (July 2013). International Law Association Conference, Sydney (2018), Final Report on Aggression and the Use of Force, p. 16. General Comment No. 36, at 70. See e.g. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Abella v. Argentina, November 18, 1997, at 161; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, pp. 211‒236; ICJ, Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda (Judgment of 19 December 2005), paras. 216. Human Rights Committee, General Comment (GC) No. 36, at 64. 39