A/HRC/33/55 reached all besieged areas at least once in the calendar year. Where land routes remained blocked, relief supplies were dropped from the air. Dozens of United Nations-assisted airdrops into western Dayr az-Zawr city, for example, were able to provide temporary relief assistance to thousands of civilians. 9. Despite these initially encouraging signs, there has been a marked upsurge in fighting since late March, with grave consequences for civilians. Pro-Government forces, allegedly targeting locations occupied by the terrorist groups Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Jabhat al-Nusra, maintained their aerial and artillery bombardments on opposition-held territories, including Idlib city, Maarat Al-Numan and eastern Aleppo city throughout the reporting period. In many instances, anti-Government armed groups have been targeted as well, resulting in retaliation and a return to fighting. Government forces launched offensive operations against opposition-held locations in the Aleppo and Damascus countryside. Intermittent shelling by anti-Government armed groups on Government-controlled areas of Aleppo has also been reported. 10. Direct external support to belligerents, as well as support filtered through proxies, continues. This has fuelled further violence and undermined prospects for a peaceful settlement. Support provided by different States to their respective protégés has had a far more significant effect than support from other sources. Such backing ensures the fragmentation and general decentralization of the conflict, making the potential for a coherent diplomatic resolution of the crisis less attainable. 11. On 14 March, the Russian Federation announced that it would withdraw a significant part of its military assets deployed in the Syrian Arab Republic since September 2015. The Russian presence in the Latakia airbase and Tartous naval base would reportedly remain, and there would be continued involvement in concerted action against the designated terrorist groups ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra. Russian aerial support to government forces and affiliated militias continued, with varying intensity, notably in Aleppo and Idlib governorates. 12. Government forces continue to maintain an important operational edge and initiative over anti-Government armed groups and Jabhat al-Nusra on a number of front lines and in a number of localities. While losing some territory in southern Aleppo countryside, government forces have pushed through strategic locations around Aleppo city. They have taken control of the Castello road, the only access point to opposition-held areas of the city. The road is now within the direct firing range of government forces. If fully realized, a siege of Aleppo would put an estimated 300,000 civilians under siege. 13. On 27 March, government forces were able to wrest control of Palmyra, Homs, from ISIL, providing an added strategic and symbolic advantage. In Rif Damascus, considered to be the vital belt around the capital, government forces made slow but strategic gains in eastern Ghouta and the besieged town of Daraya to the west. Negotiations are also reportedly ongoing to evacuate the Yarmouk camp for Palestinian refugees, located to the south of Damascus. 14. In recent months, anti-Government armed groups continued to fight on multiple fronts. While they made modest gains — for example, in the southern Aleppo countryside — the groups have either stagnated or retreated along some vital front lines. Extensive aerial operations and support by the Russian Air Force to government forces increased infighting among various armed groups, including Jabhat al-Nusra, and the loss of crucial supply roads have generally weakened the posture of the anti-Government armed groups. Infighting between Jaysh al-Islam and Faylaq ar-Rahman reportedly led to hundreds of casualties in early June and is said to have facilitated advances of government forces into the town of Douma in eastern Ghouta. On 27 May, in the northern Aleppo countryside, 4