A/HRC/41/48 great public interest and have the highest level of protection under the American Convention” and stated that the “legitimate protection of the principles of judicial independence and impartiality cannot be premised on the notion that a judge must remain silent on public issues” (paras. 157 and 165). 45. The motive for making a statement is also relevant in the assessment made by the European Court of Human Rights concerning the proportionality of the interference. 29 In the Baka case, the Court expressed the view that the applicant’s statements, which clearly fell within the context of a debate on matters of great public interest, “did not go beyond mere criticism from a strictly professional perspective” (para. 171). In the Wille case, the Court observed that there was no evidence to conclude that the applicant’s lecture contained any remarks on pending cases, severe criticism of persons or public institutions or insults of high officials or the Prince (para. 67). On the other hand, “an act motivated by a personal grievance or a personal antagonism or the expectation of personal advantage, including pecuniary gain, would not justify a particularly strong level of protection”.30 46. The nature and severity of the penalties imposed are factors to be taken into account when assessing the proportionality of any interference with the freedom of expression. In the Kudeshkina case, for example, the European Court of Human Rights considered that the loss of the judicial office was the strictest available penalty that could be imposed in the disciplinary proceedings (para. 98). In a number of cases, the Court also considered the “chilling effect” that the penalty imposed on the applicant was likely to have on other judges, who might be discouraged from participating in future debates on legislative reforms affecting the judiciary and more generally on issues concerning the independence of the judiciary.31 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights reached a similar conclusion in the López Lone case (para. 176). 47. Human rights courts and mechanisms have also contributed to clarifying the extent to which judges and prosecutors may express their views on cases sub judice or, more in general, through the press. 48. Judges and prosecutors should always refrain from making any comment that might affect the outcome of proceedings or the fair trial of any person or issue before them. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights shows that the opinions expressed by the judge on a pending case and the tone and content of his or her decision may lead to a violation of the right to a fair trial. In Kyprianou v. Cyprus, for example, the Court found that the tone and words used in a verdict concerning a contempt of court case were too emotional, and concluded that the court “had failed to satisfy the requirement of impartiality under both the objective and subjective tests”.32 49. The Consultative Council of European Judges observed that judges have to show circumspection in their relations with the press and be able to maintain their independence and impartiality. This means that, as a general rule, they should refrain from any unjustified comments on the cases they are dealing with or which are pending before other judges. 33 If the media or interested members of the public criticize a decision, a judge should avoid answering such criticism by writing to the press or responding to journalists’ questions. A judge should only answer the legitimate expectations of the citizens through clearly motivated decisions.34 50. The European Court of Human Rights has dealt with a number of cases concerning judges who expressed their opinions on the media. 35 The Court stressed that in order to preserve their image as impartial judges, judicial authorities “are required to exercise 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 10 Venice Commission, “Report on the freedom of expression of judges”, para. 75. Kudeshkina v. Russia, para. 95. Baka v. Hungary, paras. 167 and 173; Wille v. Liechtenstein, para. 50; and Kudeshkina, para. 99. Application No. 73797/01, 15 December 2005, para. 122. Consultative Council of European Judges, Opinion No. 3, para. 40. UNODC, Commentary on the Bangalore Principles, paras. 74–75. See Buscemi v. Italy (application No. 29569/95), judgment of 16 September 1999; Lavents v. Latvia, (application No. 58442/00), judgment of 28 November 2002; Olujic v. Croatia (application No. 22330/05), judgment of 5 February 2009.