A/HRC/41/48 39. The third condition is that the interference must conform to the strict tests of necessity and proportionality. In its general comment No. 34 (paras. 22 and 34), the Human Rights Committee points out that restrictive measures must conform to the principle of proportionality, be appropriate to achieve their protective function, be the least intrusive instrument among those that might achieve their protective function and be proportionate to the interest to be protected. The principle of proportionality has to be respected, not only in the law that frames the restrictions but also by the administrative and judicial authorities in applying the law. In the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, an interference is deemed necessary in a democratic society when it responds to a “pressing social need” and is “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”.28 Jurisprudence of regional human rights courts 40. The jurisprudence of regional human rights courts and mechanisms offers invaluable guidance in defining the limits to which judges and prosecutors are subject when exercising their freedom of expression. In particular, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights shows that, in assessing whether the national authorities have struck a fair balance between the right to freedom of expression of the individual judge and the legitimate interest of the authorities to protect the authority and the impartiality of the judiciary, the impugned statement should be considered in the light of all the concrete circumstances of the case as a whole. In this assessment, a number of factors are taken into account, including the office held by the applicant, the content of the impugned statement, the context in which the statement was made and the nature and severity of the penalties imposed. In two cases, the high-ranking position held by the applicant within the judiciary was one of the essential factors taken into account by the European Court in assessing whether, in view of the specific duties and responsibilities inherent to that status, the applicant had infringed his duty of loyalty and discretion through the opinion he expressed. 41. In Baka v. Hungary, the President of the Supreme Court of Hungary complained that the early termination of his mandate following the views he expressed on various legislative and constitutional reforms affecting the judiciary violated his right to freedom of expression. In reaching the conclusion that the premature termination of the applicant’s mandate had been in breach of article 10 of the Convention, the European Court attached a particular importance to the office held by the applicant and considered that, in his professional capacity as President of the Supreme Court and of the National Council of Justice, the applicant had not only the right, but also the duty, to express his opinion on legislative reforms affecting the judiciary (para. 168). In Wille v. Liechtenstein, the high-ranking status of the applicant within the judiciary led the European Court to the same conclusion (para. 64). 42. The content of the impugned statement and the context in which it is delivered assume special relevance with regard to cases concerning the exercise of freedom of expression as part of a public debate. 43. In the Wille case, the Court considered that, although the applicant’s lecture concerned matters of constitutional law, which inevitably had political implications, that element alone should not prevent the applicant from making a statement on that matter (para. 67). In Kudeshkina v. Russia, which deals with the dismissal of a judge following her fierce criticism of the judiciary in the media, the Court considered that the applicant had raised “a very important matter of public interest, which should be open to free debate in a democratic society” and recalled that, in its case law, it had attributed particular importance to the unhindered exercise of freedom of speech by candidates in the context of electoral debate (para. 94). 44. In López Lone et al. v. Honduras, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights recognized that freedom of expression had to be guaranteed not only with regard to the dissemination of information and ideas that were received favourably or considered inoffensive or indifferent, but also those that the State or any sector of the population considered objectionable. It also underscored that “opinions relating to a coup d’état are of 28 See, for example, Baka v. Hungary, para. 158. 9