A/HRC/35/31 30. It has been established that the desire to restrict or even suspend judicial review (or its equivalent) of the constitutionality or legality of executive decisions and administrative acts and laws would be tantamount to impairing the independence of justice (see E/CN.4/2004/60, para. 29). 31. In a 2016 report, the Special Rapporteur underscored that legislative activity lacks effectiveness if there is no commitment to respect and enforce it. Moreover, whenever Governments, political and economic actors, judges, lawyers and prosecutors do not behave according to the specific roles they have to play in a democratic society, the prerequisites of independence become difficult to fulfil (see A/HRC/32/34, para. 39). Institutional safeguards 32. In a comprehensive report submitted in 2009 (A/HRC/11/41), the Special Rapporteur highlighted the features having an impact on the independence of the judiciary as an institution: the separation of the judicial function from other branches of power as prerequisite; the guarantee of independence at the constitutional level; the selection and appointment process; the prohibition of ex post facto tribunals; judicial budget; freedom of association and expression; the assignment of court cases; independence within the judiciary and investigations into allegations of improper interference. 33. The Special Rapporteur established early on that the independence and impartiality of the judiciary can be effectively secured if there is in the State a well-entrenched independent mechanism responsible for the appointment, promotion, transfer and dismissal of judges (see E/CN.4/1995/39, para. 65). 34. The Special Rapporteur has also underlined that it is important for the judiciary to have a sufficient operating budget and financial autonomy vis-à-vis the executive and legislative powers, and that budgetary independence had to be accompanied by an effective external audit (see E/CN.4/1996/37, para. 32). Individual conditions 35. In a 2009 report, the Special Rapporteur also identified important parameters to effectively guarantee the individual independence of judges: tenure and irremovability; immunity; promotion and conditions of service, including judicial salary; human and material resources and security and training. The Special Rapporteur had also noted earlier that, in addition to the traditional safeguards necessary to secure judicial independence, the character, qualifications and independence of the individual appointee make an important difference (see E/CN.4/1996/37, para. 92). 36. In several thematic reports, concerns were expressed regarding the problem of judges appointed on a provisional basis without security of tenure. As was noted, such appointments could become a serious threat to the independence of the judiciary, as provisional or temporary judges are vulnerable to executive interference and even tensions within the judiciary (see E/CN.4/1998/39, para. 183). Justice and the judiciary in a period of transition 37. From the beginning of the mandate, the Special Rapporteur has paid special attention to countries undergoing transition to democracy, since their needs were generally considerable and positive steps early in their transition would contribute significantly to achievement of the rule of law, respect for human rights and peace and prosperity (see E/CN.4/1995/39, para. 12). Special mention was made, in particular, of the understanding and respect for the principle of separation of powers as a sine qua non ingredient for democratic States and which is, therefore, of cardinal importance for countries in transition to democracy (ibid., para. 55). 38. In previous reports the Special Rapporteur has expressed concern about the problems faced by countries in transition in providing an independent and impartial justice system, in particular the lack of financial resources, the lack of human resources and of infrastructure (E/CN.4/1998/39, para. 184). 7