A/HRC/8/3 page 22 64. In interpreting the relevant provision of the American Convention on Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has recognized that the right to apply for amnesty, pardon or commutation of sentence must be read to encompass certain minimum procedural protections for condemned prisoners, if the right is to be effectively respected and enjoyed.79 It concluded that the condemned person’s procedural rights include rights (a) to apply for amnesty, pardon or commutation of sentence; (b) to be informed of when the competent authority will consider the offender’s case; (c) to make representations, in person or by counsel, to the competent authority; (d) to receive a decision from that authority within a reasonable period of time prior to his or her execution; and (e) not to have capital punishment imposed while such a petition is pending decision by the competent authority.80 The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council reached largely the same conclusions concerning the content of this norm, adding that the condemned person should normally also be given access to the documents provided to the pardoning authority.81 65. The need for such procedural safeguards to be considered an integral part of the right itself has also been underscored by cases dealt with by the Special Rapporteur. In some instances, the process for considering pardons has proven to be cursory or illusory, with the designated decision-making body failing even to meet or deliberate.82 Furthermore, since secrecy diminishes the likelihood of due process, requirements to provide the condemned person with basic information regarding the process, such as the date of consideration of the petition and notice of the decision reached, help to safeguard the integrity of the process.83 79 Rudolph Baptiste v. Grenada, Case 11.743 (13 April 2000), para. 121. 80 Ibid.; the last of these is also affirmed in Safeguards, para. 8. 81 “The procedures followed in the process of considering a man’s petition are ... open to judicial review ... [I]t is necessary that the condemned man should be given notice of the date when the [pardoning authority] will consider his case. That notice should be adequate for him or his advisers to prepare representations before a decision is taken ... The fact that the [pardoning authority] is required to look at the representations of the condemned man does not mean that they are bound to accept them. They are bound to consider them ... It is ... not sufficient that the man be given a summary or the gist of the material available to the [pardoning authority]; there are too many opportunities for misunderstandings or omissions. He should normally be given in a situation like the present the documents.” (Neville Lewis, et al. v. Attorney General of Jamaica, et al., Privy Council Appeals Nos. 60 of 1999, 65 of 1999, 69 of 1999 and 10 of 2000, judgement of 12 September 2000.) See also the Judicial Committee in Reckley v. Minister of Public Safety (No. 2) [1996] 1 All ER 562 and De Freitas v. Benny [1976] A.C. 239. 82 83 E/CN.4/1998/68/Add.3, para. 102; E/CN.4/1987/20, para. 45. As the Special Rapporteur has observed previously: “The uncertainty and seclusion inflicted by opaque processes place due process rights at risk, and there have, unfortunately, been cases in which secrecy in the post-conviction process has led to a miscarriage of justice.” E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.3, para. 26.