A/HRC/8/3 page 10 4. Problems encountered in relation to commissions of inquiry 27. A comprehensive review of the work of the Special Rapporteur since 1982 indicates that many commissions have achieved very little. They are often set up to show domestic constituents and the international community that the Government has the will and capability to address impunity. Subsequent assessments undertaken by the Special Rapporteurs, however, indicate that many of them have in fact done little other than deflect criticism. A review of the specific commissions reported on by the Special Rapporteurs indicates that they have consistently failed to meet the basic standards set out above. In order to understand more fully where commissions commonly fail and how international actors should engage with them, this section details the main problems encountered in relation to the conduct or outcomes of commissions of inquiry. (a) Inquiry fails to take place 28. Sometimes, commissions are announced with great fanfare, but an inquiry never actually begins its work.20 Self evidently, in such cases, a commission is simply put forward to appease Government critics, but there is no actual Government will to use the institution to address impunity. (b) Limited mandate 29. A commission may be limited in its effectiveness by the terms of its mandate. The mandate may be unduly narrow or restricted in a way that undermines its credibility or usefulness. This is particularly the case where the mandate preempts the outcome of the inquiry or where a mandate restricts who a commission may investigate (for example, by prohibiting it from investigating Government actors).21 (c) Insufficient funding or resources 30. In some cases, the lack of funding or provision of basic resources to a commission have been extremely detrimental to the ability of the commission to function, even where its members have the will to conduct investigations. This is more than simply a technical matter; the adequacy of resources provided to a commission upon its establishment can be a useful indicator of the good faith of the Government and perhaps also of its potential effectiveness. 31. In his 1987 report, for example, Special Rapporteur Amos Wako reported on his visit to Uganda.22 In 1984 and 1985, the Special Rapporteur had sent allegation letters to Uganda, and in March 1986, Uganda promised the Commission on Human Rights that it would establish a commission to investigate violations of human rights. In August 1986, the Special Rapporteur visited Uganda to follow up the allegations he had received and to report on the work of the 20 E/CN.4/1994/7, para. 202; E/CN.4/1996/4/Add.1, para. 38 21 E/CN.4/2005/7/Add.2, para. 43. 22 E/CN.4/1987/20.