A/HRC/29/37 sit uneasily with human rights evidence.14 Social networks are effective at increasing participation, in part because they lessen the motivation that participation requires, which can lead to shallow or fickle forms of activism (so-called “clicktivism”).15 However, some have argued that such seemingly insignificant moves are significant in their accumulation, demonstrating a “supportive environment” and “drawing awareness”.16 C. Prevention and protection 49. ICTs can contribute to the prevention of violations of the right to life, by State or non-State actors, in a variety of ways. First of all, alert applications can provide physical and digital protection to potentially vulnerable groups, including human rights defenders. While that enables networks to take advantage of digital connectivity, the very same connectivity is a risk for those vulnerable to digital snooping or other forms of surveillance. Secondly, there is need for education on digital security and safety. Surveillance can, however, also be a preventive mechanism, and tactics ranging from live-streaming demonstrations or police operations to using satellite imagery will be discussed below. 1. Alert applications 50. Various organizations are developing alert applications that activists, journalists and others can use to send a signal that they are in danger. For example, Amnesty International developed a “panic button” application — disguised as an ordinary utility — that allows users secretly to activate an alarm by sending a text message, and, optionally, geolocation data, that can be sent to pre-selected contacts by rapidly pressing the power button of the phone. When activists or journalists are attacked or detained, their phones are often taken for the lists of contacts they store. The hidden application will continue to broadcast alerts, which are not only calls for help but also warnings to the person’s contacts that they should take security precautions themselves. 17 Other applications or devices have been developed with the same objective.18 51. Such applications respond to the challenges posed by a lack of information and time lags, which can restrict efforts to protect individuals at risk. Practitioners believe that there is an approximately 48-hour window after an individual is detained or threatened during which a large-scale response is most likely to have the greatest effect. There are numerous examples worldwide in which mass response to detention — coordinated using social media or otherwise — has persuaded authorities to recalculate the merits of keeping an individual in custody. 52. The new technologies thus fit into wider and long-standing strategies of communicating with a trusted network when at risk and mobilizing a wide community to respond vocally or visibly to an arbitrary act against an individual. It is important, however, to bear in mind the potential risks of such technology which could become the basis of identification and targeting. 14 15 16 17 18 Dustin N. Sharp, “Human rights fact-finding and the reproduction of hierarchies” (6 June 2014), Social Science Research Network, http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2341186. Malcolm Gladwell, “Small change: why the revolution will not be tweeted”, The New Yorker (4 October 2010), www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell. Stephanie Vie, “In defense of ʻslacktivismʼ: the Human Rights Campaign Facebook logo as digital activism”, First Monday, vol. 19, No. 4 (April 2014), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/ view/4961. See https://panicbutton.io/. BBC News, “Smart bracelet protects aid workers” (5 April 2013), www.bbc.com/news/technology22038012. 9