A/HRC/3/2 page 59 There is ample evidence pointing to a significant increase in the intensity of the overall bombardment including cluster munitions in the last 72 hours of the conflict, including the period after the adoption of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). OCHA affirms that 90 per cent of all cluster bombs and their sub-munitions were fired by IDF into south Lebanon during these last 72 hours of the conflict.212 For example, cluster bombardments were particularly heavy in and around the Tibnin hospital grounds, especially on 13 August when 2,000 civilians were seeking shelter there. 250. UNMACC, in cooperation with the Lebanese armed forces (National De-mining Office), has identified a total of 789 cluster strike locations throughout Lebanon. As of 31 October 2006, the estimate is that over one million cluster bombs had been fired in Lebanon. The reported dud rate of cluster munitions is as high as 40 per cent.213 In other words, many of the bomblets did not explode but, rather like anti-personnel mines, they littered the ground with the potential to explode at any time later. 251. This wide use of cluster bombs has been admitted by Israeli forces. On 12 September, the Haaretz newspaper quoted an IDF unit commander stating that “[I]n order to compensate for the rockets’ imprecision, the order was to “flood” the area with them. … We have no option of striking an isolated target, and the commanders know this very well”. He also stated that the reserve soldiers were surprised by the use of MLRS rockets, because during their regular army service, they were told these are ‘judgment day weapons’ of IDF and intended for use in a full-scale war.214 An Israeli reservist soldier interviewed by the same newspaper also stated that “[I]n the last 72 hours we fired all the munitions we had, all at the same spot, we didn’t even alter the direction of the gun. Friends of mine in the battalion told me they also fired everything in the last three days - ordinary shells, clusters, whatever they had.”215 With regard to the exact timing of the launching of the cluster rockets, a unit commander said “[T]hey told us that this is a good time because people are coming out of the mosques and the rockets would deter them.”216 The commander also said that at least in one case, they were asked to fire cluster rockets toward “a village’s outskirts” in the early morning. 252. During the conflict, including the last 72 hours, IDF cluster strikes were concentrated on three main areas of southern Lebanon. First, in the areas immediately to the east and south east of Tyre, a heavy populated area. The locality was possibly targeted because of its very rich agricultural area specializing in banana and citrus orchards, but more probably because it was used by Hezbollah to fire missiles using the orchards as cover.217 Second, in the Tibnin area, which is a Hezbollah stronghold. Lastly, in the area north of the Litani; this is more difficult to explain, as it is known to be outside the range of Hezbollah rockets into Israel. The argument for using cluster bombs to interdict rocket firings therefore does not apply. 253. There is also ample evidence that cluster bombs were used in an indiscriminate manner and that many towns and villages were littered with the bomblets as well as large tracts of agricultural land. In addition to Tibnin, Nabatiyeh, Yahmor, Ain Ibel,Yaroun, Bent J’beil, Qfar Tibnit and Swane were also deliberate targets of cluster bombings. 254. The particular military use of these munitions lies in the wide area the munitions can cover. It provides the military with a very effective weapon against targets such as troops in the open or in defensive positions, artillery batteries, and concentrations of vehicles or tanks. However, the inherent area coverage of cluster munitions calls for clear separation between