A/HRC/38/35 (e) Conduct ongoing review of their efforts to respect rights, including through regular consultation with stakeholders, and frequent, accessible and effective communication with affected groups and the public (principles 20−21); (f) Provide appropriate remediation, including through operational-level grievance mechanisms that users may access without aggravating their “sense of disempowerment” (principles 22, 29 and 31). III. Key concerns with content regulation 12. Governments seek to shape the environment in which companies moderate content, while the companies predicate individual access to their platforms on user agreement with terms of service that govern what may be expressed and how individuals may express it. A. Government regulation 13. States regularly require companies to restrict manifestly illegal content such as representations of child sexual abuse, direct and credible threats of harm and incitement to violence, presuming they also meet the conditions of legality and necessity.25 Some States go much further and rely on censorship and criminalization to shape the online regulatory environment.26 Broadly worded restrictive laws on “extremism”, blasphemy, defamation, “offensive” speech, “false news” and “propaganda” often serve as pretexts for demanding that companies suppress legitimate discourse.27 Increasingly, States target content specifically on online platforms.28 Other laws may interfere with online privacy in ways that deter the exercise of freedom of opinion and expression.29 Many States also deploy tools of disinformation and propaganda to limit the accessibility and trustworthiness of independent media.30 14. Liability protections. From early in the digital age, many States adopted rules to protect intermediaries from liability for the content third parties publish on their platforms. The European Union e-commerce directive, for instance, establishes a legal regime to protect intermediaries from liability for content except when they go beyond their role as a “mere conduit”, “cache” or “host” of information provided by users.31 Section 230 of the United States Communications Decency Act generally provides immunity for providers of “interactive computer service[s]” that host or publish information about others, but this has since been curtailed.32 The intermediary liability regime in Brazil requires a court order to restrict particular content,33 while the intermediary liability regime in India establishes a “notice and takedown” process that involves the order of a court or similar adjudicative 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 6 Ireland has established co-regulatory mechanisms with companies to restrict illegal child sexual abuse material: Ireland submission. Many companies rely on a picture recognition algorithm to detect and remove child pornography: submissions by Open Technology Institute, p. 2 and ARTICLE 19, p. 8. See A/HRC/32/38, paras. 46−47. On Internet shutdowns, see A/HRC/35/22, paras. 8−16 and examples of communications of the Special Rapporteur: Nos. UA TGO 1/2017, UA IND 7/2017 and AL GMB 1/2017. Communication Nos. OL MYS 1/2018; UA RUS 7/2017; UA ARE 7/2017, AL BHR 8/2016, AL SGP 5/2016 and OL RUS 7/2016. Azerbaijan prohibits propaganda of terrorism, religious extremism and suicide: Azerbaijan submission. See communication Nos. OL PAK 8/2016 and OL LAO 1/2014; Association for Progressive Communications, Unshackling Expression: A Study on Laws Criminalising Expression Online in Asia, GISWatch 2017 Special Edition. A/HRC/29/32. See, for example, Gary King, Jennifer Pan and Margaret E. Roberts, “How the Chinese Government fabricates social media posts for strategic distraction, not engaged argument”, American Political Science Review, vol. 111, No. 3 (2017), pp. 484−501. Directive No. 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000. 47 United States Code § 230. See also the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (H.R. 1865). Marco Civil da Internet, federal law 12.965, arts. 18−19.