A/HRC/19/69 within the unit and to prevent collective disobedience or desertion when orders to commit crimes were received. 95. The commission observed that large-scale operations conducted in different governorates – such as raids on neighbourhoods or attacks on larger demonstrations (see paragraphs 59 and 60 above) – often involved a similar modus operandi and related patterns of violations, which suggests that they were based on uniform directives from the State. Over the last three months of the period under review in particular, the army conducted a number of similar large-scale operations in at least four governorates, in which it surrounded entire neighbourhoods where anti-Government armed groups were present, then shelled these residential areas with heavy weapons, with complete disregard for potential civilian casualties. 96. The most intense of these operations, conducted in Hama and Homs, were carried out after the Minister for Foreign Affairs publicly stated, on 24 January 2012, that a “security solution was imposed by necessity which has become obvious with the existence of the armed militias of the so-called „Free Army‟ and other armed groups not affiliated to it that commit crimes.”19 The declaration was followed by a statement by the Minister for the Interior, on 29 January, who stressed that “the Internal Security Forces‟ keenness on continuing efforts to purify the Syrian land from all outlaws to achieve justice and restore stability and security to Syria.”20 2. Individual responsibility for violations 97. In examining specific operations, the commission received credible and consistent evidence identifying high- and mid-ranking members of the armed forces who ordered their subordinates to shoot at unarmed protestors, kill soldiers who refused to obey such orders, arrest persons without cause, mistreat detained persons and attack civilian neighbourhoods with indiscriminate tank and machine-gun fire. In some cases, they gave explicit orders to commit crimes, in others they used more general terms (e.g. “use any force necessary”) that, in the circumstances, left no room for interpretation. The commission verified that, in some locations, individual army officers ordered the indiscriminate shelling of civilian neighbourhoods in urban areas such as Hama, Al Ladhiqiyah, Dar‟a and Homs. 98. Individual officers in the armed forces and Government security forces personally killed, unlawfully imprisoned, tortured, or committed other inhumane acts against innocent civilians. Officers shot unarmed protestors, including children, as well as medical doctors, ambulance drivers and mourners at funerals in cities such as Al Ladhiqiyah, Dar‟a,, Saida (Dar‟a governorate), Zabadani and Jobar (Rif Dimashq governorate) and Almastoumah (Idlib governorate). 99. Army officers and members of the security forces also aided and abetted attacks against civilians; for example, commanders of Government security forces routinely placed their units behind conscripts to ensure that the soldiers would fire at demonstrators. On several occasions, security forces shot conscripts who disobeyed orders to shoot protestors. Furthermore, military officers and commanders of security forces often stationed their units at checkpoints and other strategic locations in urban areas so that other units could attack neighbourhoods to loot homes and arrest residents. In addition, security force commanders 19 20 18 “Al-Moallem: the observers‟ report didn't please those plotting against Syria: the solution is Syrian and based on the people's interests”, SANA, 24 January 2012. Available from www.sana.sy/eng/21/2012/01/24/396268.htm. “Interior Ministry honors families of martyrs”, SANA, 29 January 2012. Available from www.sana.sy/eng/21/2012/01/29/397129.htm.