A/HRC/19/69 managed detention centres throughout the country where prisoners were subjected to torture, sexual assaults and other inhumane acts. 3. Command and superior responsibility 100. A number of military commanders and civilian superiors may reasonably be suspected of responsibility for crimes against humanity because of their knowing failure to take all necessary and reasonable measures within their power to prevent or repress the commission of relevant crimes by their subordinates or to submit the matter to the competent authorities. 101. During the past year, soldiers and members of security forces who refused to obey manifestly unlawful orders to commit crimes against humanity frequently were subjected to severe punishment, including execution, a vivid illustration of the level of control that commanders hold over their subordinates. The broad and repetitive nature of these crimes and the availability of public reports on such crimes by international media broadcasting in Arabic, United Nations human rights mechanisms and the observer mission of the League of Arab States all indicate that military commanders and civilian superiors at the highest levels must have had knowledge of such events. On 7 December 2011, in a televised interview, the President himself referred to the findings made by the present commission in its first report. 102. Notwithstanding this knowledge about crimes, no serious effort was made to prevent and repress them. As discussed above, the commission is not aware of any successful prosecutions; indeed, the commission documented how some officers who directly participated in crimes against humanity were promoted or commended. The commission‟s evidence also demonstrates a consistent and continuing effort by the Government, the military and the security forces to conceal the facts about crimes. State officials often forced families of those killed by State forces to sign declarations attributing responsibility to armed groups before they would allow the body of the person killed to be released. Where such false declarations were signed, branch offices of the National Independent Legal Commission refused to carry out investigations. The commission of inquiry also found that pro-Government media were used to cover up violations or falsely attribute them to anti-Government armed groups. 103. Structural obstacles, including the immunity from prosecution enjoyed by members of the State forces, and the dependence of the judiciary on the presidency and the Baath Party have fostered impunity. 21 104. Under the present legal framework and circumstances, it appears that the judiciary lacks the capacity to effectively address crimes against humanity committed on the basis of State policy. B. Anti-Government armed groups, including Free Syrian Army groups 105. By all accounts, anti-Government armed groups, especially FSA groups, have become much more active since November 2011. The commission assumes to have described only part of the spectrum of anti-Government armed groups that have emerged and their activities. 21 A/HRC/S.17/2/Add.1, paras. 21 and 22. 19