A/HRC/19/69 A. State authorities 1. State policies and directives 89. The evidence collected since its first report affirms the commission‟s conviction that gross human rights violations were conducted pursuant to a policy of the State, and that orders to commit such violations originated from policies and directives issued at the highest levels of the armed forces and the Government. 17 This follows from the nature of the operations involving gross violations and information the commission obtained regarding the planning and implementation process. 90. The commission interviewed individuals with inside knowledge of the planning process. It received reliable accounts that the National Security Bureau18 of the Baath Party National Command was used to translate policy directives from a higher level into joint strategic plans underlying operations. These plans directed State forces and agencies with regard to their expected contributions to operations. On the basis of the Bureau‟s plans and directives, security agency directors passed orders on to their branch offices in the governorates. Orders to the army passed through the military chain of command. 91. At the local level, military and security forces, civilian authorities and Baath Party officials coordinated operations through local security committees, which were usually dominated by the local representatives of security agencies and commanders of army units deployed in the area. On several occasions, senior security officials were deployed from the capital to coordinate operations involving crimes against humanity and other gross violations. 92. Most crimes against humanity and gross human rights violations were carried out in complex operations that involved the entire security apparatus, and therefore would have required superior directives. The four major intelligence and security agencies with direct reporting lines to the Presidency – Military Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, the General Intelligence Directorate and the Political Security Directorate – were at the heart of almost all operations. Most divisions of the Syrian Arab Army, and on some occasions also Syrian Arab Navy units and Air Force defence troops, participated in operations that were conducted in their areas of deployment. However, as the crisis has evolved, the elite army units closest to the leadership – the Special Forces, the Republican Guard and the Fourth Division – have played an increasingly prominent role, the latter two especially in Damascus and its suburbs. 93. State officials, aided by certain businessmen with links to the security apparatus, also paid, armed and informally organized the groups of de facto agents known as Shabbiha. In a number of operations, the commission documented how Shabbiha members were strategically employed to commit crimes against humanity and other gross violations. In other cases, their participation was difficult to verify, as many operations also involved plain-clothed security agents. 94. For many operations, reinforcements were sent from the capital, including on some occasions Special Forces transported by Air Force helicopters. In many cases, State officials carefully organized operations so that units were disassembled into their sub-units, which were then deployed to different places, where they would be regrouped with members of other units and members of the security forces prior to the start of operations. Testimony from defectors indicates that this strategy was employed to break bonds of trust 17 18 See A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, paras. 102 and 103. Membership of the Bureau includes, but is not limited to, the heads of the four main intelligence and security agencies, the Deputy National Secretary of the Baath Party and the Minister for the Interior. 17